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1) Fulwood Army Barracks. North-west Armed Forces HQ and Regional Seat 
of Government. 
2) Sub-regional Control 101 (Lancashire and Cumbria). Basement of 
Government/DHSS offices at Duke's House, Houghton St, Southport. 
Partially flooded and probably useless at present. 
3) Sub-regional Control 102 . Ex-ROTOR station bunker, Hack Green, 
near Nantwich. 
4) Cumbria County Control. Carlisle Castle. 
5) Cumbria standby County Control. Not known, but possibly the district 
control, also used by the Navy, at Abbot's Wood, Mill Brow, Barrow. 
Westleigh, showing 
aerial and 
ventilation pipe 
emerging from 
the bunker at the 
back. 
6) Lancashire County Control. Emergency planning HQ, Westleigh, Lea 
Rd, Preston. 
7) Lancashire standby County Control. Town Hall basement, Lancaster. 
8) Merseyside County Control. Walker Art Gallery extension, William 
Brown st, Liverpool. ('Old civil defence building', perhaps 
dating from World War II). 
9) Merseyside standby County Control. Basement, Technical College, 
Mornington Rd, Southport (district education authority premises) . 
10) Manchester County Control. Ex war room, Mill Lane, Cheadle. 
11) Manchester Standby County Control . Basement, Bolton Town Hall. 
12) Cheshire County Control. Basement, County Hall, Chester. 
13 ) Cheshire standby County Control. Basement, Municipal Buildings, 
Earl St, Crewe. 
14) Weeton. Home Office Supply and Transport Depot. 
15) Pilling. Home Office Regional Wireless Depot. 
16) Billinge. Home Office Wireless Depot (and relay station). 
17) Burtonwood. Home Office Supply and Transport Depot (and US base). 
18) Cumbria County Police HQ, Penrith. 
19) Lancashire County Police HQ, Hutton, near Preston. 
20) Merseyside County Police HQ, Liverpool. 
21) Manchester County Police HQ, Chester St, l1anchester. 
22) Cheshire County Police HQ, Chester. 
23) UKWMO Western Sector Control, Langley Lane, Goosnargh. 
24) ROC Group HQ, near RAF Carlisle. 
WBATCBANCE 
WAR? 
" Deterrence is dead" 
5 
-us strategist 
"According to a Brookings Institution Study, prepared in co-operation with the 
Department of Defence, the U. S. government threatened the use of strategic nuclear 
weapons no less than 18 times between 1946 and 1970." 
-'Counter Spy' July/August 1982 
The political decision to use nuclear weapons has already been made. They await 
only the opportunity. 
There was once a time, not so long ago, when nuclear weapons existed in theory 
only to prevent wars, not to fight them. They were 'the ultimate deterrent' because 
if used by either side, there would be Mutually Assured Destruction'-MAD for 
short . eND flourished for the first time in the naive belief that this was the ultimate 
in military horrors. Looking back, the early 1960s seems like a time of happy 
stability, for now the old theory of deterrence has gone, although it is still used by 
governments to justify their nuclear arsenals to their own peoples. 
I n the last 20 years, the accuracy of nuclear weapons has increased enormously, 
most notably in the new cruise missiles, and strategists now plan to use their own 
nuclear weapons to knock out the other side's--a 'counterforce' strategy. This 
means striking first, while an enemy's weapons are still on the ground-in fact, it 
means striking before the enemy even realises there will be a nuclear war. As well 
as the new missiles, there now exist battlefield nuclear weapons for just about 
every purpose-bombs, rockets, shells, mortars, depth charges and so on. Britain 
has an estimated 1400 nuclear warheads; it seems likely that the Falklands task 
force carried some of them. In short: since nuclear weapons are now designed to 
fight and win wars, since every advantage is now to be had from striking first, and 
since NATO's idea that a nuclear war could be kept 'limited', the nuclear thre-
shold has dropped alarmingly. 
Nuclear alarms and threats have become staggeringly commonplace. During 
the 1962 missile crisis, reports Calder, 'American bombers were orbiting the 
Soviet Union , waiting for the order to go in' . President Nixon put NATO on a 
top-level nuclear alert during the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. In November 1979, a tape 
simulating a Russian nuclear attack was accidentally put into the US air defence 
computer, and large numbers of nuclear bomb,ers were scrambled into the air. If 
such a thing were to happen once either side has one of the projected computer-
ised 'launch on warning' defence systems, a simple scare could become an auto-
mated holocaust. J 
Even a 'limited' nuclear war will engulf Europe. Nigel Calder, impartially 
researching among top NATO strategists for the BBC, concludes that any sort of 
'limited' nuclear war is highly unlikely: 'the most probable kind of nuclear war in 
the era of counterforce weapons is one in which both sides simply smash each 
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other as rapidJy as they can , while their missiles survive'. Some 15,000 weapons 
from both sides would then fall on Europe: 'in the course of an hour Europe can be 
turned from a garden continent thronged with admiring tourists, into a festering 
ruin far worse than all the other hells Europeans have ever made-Verdun , 
Auschwitz, Dresden .. .' 
Second only to West Germany as a target, but far more densely packed with 
bases and people, Britain would be the darkest comer of a dead continent . The 
government proclaims that ' if we have the sort of nuclear attack which we think we 
can expect', between 25 and 40 million people would die from the more immediate 
effects; 5% of the land area would suffer serious blast damage and 20% would 
have some blast damage. This is rubbish . After re-working the government's own 
figures, Open University scientist Philip Steadman accused it of 'a gross distortion 
of the evidence'. He found that 20% of the land surface of Britain would suffer 
serious blast damage, while at least 34% (containing 60% of the population) and 
probably over 40% would have some blast damage. More generally , the Guar-
dian's science correspondent, Anthony Tucker, has (in Crucible of Despair) 
described the 'systematic and deliberate underplaying of nuclear weapons effects' 
by the Home Office . 2 
The sort of nuclear attack which the government thinks it can expect was shown 
in the imaginary target maps for the Operation Square Leg exercise in Autumn 
1981; 200 megatons of nuclear explosive, with the power of 16,000 Hiroshima 
bombs, fell on nearly 100 targets in England, Scotland and Wales . Using US 
government assumptions, such an attack would kill 75% of the population out-
right, regardless of future casualties from radiation illness and disease (which 
eventually doubled the death toli in Hiroshima), and wipe out virtually our entire 
industrial resource base . In fact, the size of the Warsaw Pact arsenal available for 
an attack on the UK suggests that we could expect a first strike of between 400 and 
600 megatons, while the Secretary of State for the Air Force has admitted that an 
attack of 'more than 1000 megatons' would be needed to make sure of destroying 
our future share of cruise missiles. The main fire zone alone in this case would 
cover most of England and Wales and extend well into the north-west. 3 
TARGET 
NORTH-WEST 
Even this region, far from the main concentration of air bases , is an important 
target, either for a 'limited' strike against vital energy sources or from an attack 
designed to eliminate long-term 'recovery capability' (industry , peopJe and cities) . 
The north-west also has some important military targets. The main targets in the 
region are shown in figure 1. Some of them were 'hit' by warheads of between a 
half and three megatons in Operation Square Leg; a number also appeared on a 
Soviet map of military potential targets in Britain , published in 19804 
COMMUNICATIONS Perhaps the biggest risk is the VLF radi~ s.tati~n at 
Anthorn near Carlisle, which 'relays reports from Fylingdales ballIstiC missile 
• Possible Target 
o Airburst in 'Square Leg' 
o Groundburst in 'Square Leg' 
Valley (Anglesey) 
Leeds and 
Bradfon:I 
/ 
Figure 1. Possible nuclear targets in the north-west. Only selected military sites and 
airfields are included; some others are given in figure 9, and in the text. 
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radar back to the American Air Defence HQ are Cheyenne Mountain, Colorado', 
and also backs up similar stations at Rugby and Criggion in communicating with 
Polaris submarines. Criggion is in north Shropshire, while the most important US 
undersea monitoring facility in Europe is at Valley in Anglesey; large parts ofthe 
region would be at risk from the fallout from groundburst attacks on these, 
depending on the wind direction. 
MILITARY BASES Burt()nwood, near Warrington , is the site of a truly gigantic 
US army store and helicopter base, one of only two in the country which stock the 
whole range of US Army equipment. It is also, according to Duncan Campbell, 
'the probable site for the US Army's reserve stocks of theatre nuclear weapons', 
and thus a very likely target. Fallout from another US arms base at Ditton Priors in 
North Shropshire also threatens the north-west. Liverpool docks house a big US 
troop and supply landing facility. The Polaris dockyard at Barrow would be at 
risk-Cumbria's emergency planning officer believes that it would only be 
attacked if there were actually submarines there, but concedes that it would be 'a 
reasonable deduction' to suppose that, since the Russians may not know for sure, 
Barrow will be targeted anyway. The large, supersonic-capable airfield at Warton, 
near Preston, could be at risk, as well as those at Samlesbury, Blackpool, and 
Ringway, and the RAF bases at Ternhill, Sealand, Woodvale and Carlisle, 
(although none of these is of particular importance in a strike against the East). 
EN~GY FACILITIES Home Office circular ES5/1976 states that 'the risk of air 
attaYon North Sea gas and oil offshore terminals and individual oil refineries and 
electricity generating stations constitute the major threat' to the country in time of 
war. The north-west has several major energy facilities, and is Britain's main 
centre of nuclear activity. Although Heysham nuclear power station (which isn't 
working yet) was ignored in Operation Square Leg a similar reactor at Dungeness 
was probably the real target of the bomb which fell nearby on inoffensive East-
bourne. Fallout for an attack on the nuclear power stations at Wylfa, on Anglesey, 
and Chapelcross, just across the Solway Firth, would also threaten the north-west. 
The region also contains the British Nuclear Fuels nuclear fuel manufacturing 
plant at Springfields, near Preston; the URENCO uranium enrichment plant at 
Capenhurst, near Runcom; and the nuclear fuel reprocessing plant at Windscale 
(earmarked for a groundburst in Square Leg). These three are all vital parts of the 
nuclear cycle in Britain, Europe and even the USA, both for providing reactor 
fuel and nuclear bomb material. There is no reason to suppose that nuclear 
installations would specially be spared. 
Two of Britain's biggest oil refineries are at Stanlow and Ellesmere Port, on 
Merseyside; an attack on these would create an inferno that could engulf much of 
Liverpool. The projected terminal for the Morecambe Bay gas field will add to our 
worries. ' 
INDUSTRY Industry and people concentrate in cities and, believes Peter Laurie. 
'the crowded Liverpool-Manchester conurbation is almost certain to be a target in 
either a counter-force or a counter-city war'. In Square Leg, Liverpool, Manches-
ter, Birkenhead and Salford were all considered to have been targets, mainly 
because of their urban-industrial significance, and perhaps also because of the 
docks, airports and oil refineries. If the Soviet Union were determined to obliter-
ate Manchester, they might use one of their many 25-megaton warheads which, 
exploded in the air on a clear day, can create a main fire zone 55 miles across--see 
figure 2. 
• Yllrk 
Hull 
Sheffield 
Nottingham 
• 
FLASHPOINT 
MANCHESTER 
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THIS, experts predict, would be 
the trail of death and destruction 
from the fireball of a Russian 5· 
IDeraton SS·19 explodin( in cent· 
nl Manchester. 
L AT 3-4 MILES. ~Ietals vaporise as the 
&lr temperature soars to 10 million de,. 
~U!;. ~:~~h iSsuf::StaaSnt~~:~~~. and Dids-
I. AT 8 MILES. Metals melt. A bus In 
Bale would limply Iiquidise arouod its 
pUXDC'ers. 
:~r I!~o ~~r!e~. !ir~~!ft :r!Ji~,:t!~ 
RiD""ay' Airport explode. Car lyres In 
towna as rar away as Stockport melt. 
.. AT 20 MILES. Exposd woodwork In 
places as distant as Blackburn and St. 
Helena I,nltes spontaneously. 
I. AT 30 MILES. Clothes flare. In Brad-
ford, Stoke, Chester and Liverpool peo-
ple. cau,ht In tbe open are horribly 
bumed. 
.. AT CO MILES. People In towns like 
libctneld, Leeds and BlackpooJ .utrer 
NCond-derree burns and .evere bli~­
SerIDC' • 
y:r!O :n~E th~N N:~~re~:::~e;es!'~~r~e~1 
the explosion as a breath or bot alr~ 
tbou,h tbey had walked past the open 
400r 01 • turn ace. 
Figure 2. Heat effects of a 25-megaton bomb on Manchester. 
Predi~tions, ofcour~e: can be futile; the Square Leg plan is not a target map but 
(accordmg to Cumbna s Emergency Planning Officer) a collection of 'useful 
guesses'. Bombs miss their targets and fall randomly; the bomb on Fleetwood in 
Square Leg was probably a 'random', There are far more bombs than targets. 
Frank Barnaby, former director of the Stockholm International ·Peace Research 
I nstitute, estimates that by 1990 there will be enough warheads available for 
Europe alone to hit every town of 20,000 people or more on the continent: 
'pr~liferation ,and overkill have now go~e so far that the military hav:e run out of 
major targets. A top-secret US target lIst of nearly 20 years ago revealed that in 
E~rope, bridges, rai~way~ and ":I0torway intersections were targeted. (In Lanca-
shtr~, the M~/M61 JunctIOn, With the M55 and M61 joining nearby, would be 
leadmg candidate for destruction, especially since this would break the vital 
'military road route' network). To the extreme embarrassment of the Pentagon, 
many of the targets were in 'friendly countries' in western Europe and the middle 
east, doubtless to 'deny them to the enemy', The UK was not on that list, but the 
number of warheads to be targeted has grown enormously since then. Viewed as 
an 'unsinka.ble aircraft carrier' for the US, the UK could prove equally useful to 
the USSR; Its use may have to be denied them. s 
Whoever 'wins' the war, Britai~ will not live to find out. 
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THE EFFECTS OF 
NUCLEAR WEAPONS 
"Hiroshima does not look like a bombed city. It looks as if a giant steamroller had 
passed over it and squashed it out of existence. " 
-Daily Express reporter, September 1945 
Two British scientists who visited the ruins of Hiroshima suggested that to appre-
ciate what had happened there, one should imagine a Lilliput-sized model village, 
inhabited by people six inches high, and then imagine what it would look like after 
a gigantic twelve ton bomb (twice as big as any conventional bomb then in 
existence) had exploded over it. The Hiroshima bomb was a tiddler by modem 
standards, with a power of 12 kilotons, or 12,000 tons of TNT. The typical modem 
nuclear bomb has an explosive power of one megaton, or one million tons of TNT. 
Although there is no reason to suppose that Lancaster will be a nuclear target, it is 
a typical modern town, and can serve as an example. What would happen if a 
typical modem town were hit by a typical modem bomb?6 
Blast and fire effects 
A one megaton bomb exploded on the ground will produce such a searing flash 
that people in the open eight miles away will have bums needing medical attention 
if they are to survive. It will produce a fireball three miles across which will create 
an expanding firestorm with hurricane-force winds, which will last for several 
hours, suffocating everyone Within it, however well sheltered. It will dig a deep 
crater a hundred yards across, sucking the material up into a mushroom cloud 
twelve miles across and depositing it as lethal fallout over a much wider area. The 
blast wave will create a zone of serious destruction, with most private housing 
more or less destroyed, covering 104 square miles. Cloudy weather could reduce 
the burning effects of the bomb; a fine day or night could double their range. 
A diagram cannot tell us everything about these effects (a single photo can say 
much more) but figure 3 shows the blast effects. If the bomb were an airburst, 
there would be much less radioactive fallout, but a much larger zone of fire and 
blast damage. Figures can only be approximate, and the circles marked will 
roughly do for an airburst as well, except that the 'total destruction' ring, A for a 
groundburst, is at B for an airburst, while 'irreparable damage' extends to ring C, 
'serious damage' to ring D and there will be some damage and fires started as far as 
ring E, 13 miles away. All these neat figures will be ruined if there is a second 
nuclear burst, either sooner or later, near enough to affect this area; already 
weakened and damaged structures (and people) will collapse and burn much more 
easily. 
Radiation effects 
Radiation effects are of 3 sorts: prompt, short term, and long term. The Home 
Office believes that 'prompt' rays from the initial radioactive flash need not be 
II 
E 
Hospital 
Emergency Operating Theatre 
Heysham Power Station 
Bridge 
Food Store 
Microwave Tower 
~ Radio Mast 
X Town Hall 
Health Ser:vice Control 
Chemical Works 
Figure 3. Blast and fire effects of a 1 megaton bomb on Lancaster. 
EFFECTS OF A 1 MEGATON BOMB-BLAST AND FIRE 
Distance in miles Max blast I.ounediate 
from groWld zero pressure casualties 
AirburstGroundburst Obs/sq") Dead/Ser/inj 
1,000' 
2.5 1.7 A 11 98% 2% 
4.3 2.7 B 5 50% 50% 
8 4.7 ( 2 5% 40% 
13E 7.4 0 few 25% 
Wind speed 
of blast 
(mph) Damage 
Crater 
300+ Total destruction 
160 Irreparable 
damage 
65 Most houses 
wrecked 
35 Some damage; 
fires started 
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considered, because everyone within their range will die from blast or fire anyway . 
The 'short tenn' is mainly a matter of a couple of weeks, during which time 92% 
of the radiation in nuclear fallout will have decayed. Radiation is measured in rads 
or rems (similar units for our purposes). One in ten people will develop anorexia at 
40 rads, nausea at 50, vomiting at 60 and diarrhoea at 90. At 240 rads well over half 
those exposed have some or all of these symptoms, some very badly. At 350 rads 
there is a 50% probability of death without treatment; at 550 rads, 99% . Infants 
and the old are especially at risk; as little as 10 rads can abort a foetus. People who 
do not die recover within a few weeks, but may relapse and die. The Home Office 
claims that a person can absorb 220 rads within seven days and suffer 'no deterior-
ation', but admits that at 520 rads, mortality could be 100% . It also decrees that 
'those with only radiation sickness should not be admitted to hospital', for there 
will be no resources to treat them. 
Figure 4 shows the fallout effects from a 1 megaton bomb dropped on Birken-
head, assuming a typical 15 mph south-westerly wind. After 14 days, once the 
worst is over, 560 square miles have received a dose of 500 rads or more. Half of 
that area has received 1000 rads, which may be lethal even to people who shelter 
for a month in patched-up houses with a relatively good protective factor of 
between 10 and 20. Again, this picture is idealised-idealised because in practice 
bombs falling even long distances apart would create overlapping fallout zones, 
combining to produce local 'hot spots' which make planning and mathematical 
forecasting quite impossible , even without the complication of changing winds. 
In the long tenn, even very low radiation doses can produce illnesses such as 
cancer and leukemia; the current limit for workers in nuclear industries is 5 rads a 
year, still too high for the liking of many experts. These effects alone will produce 
a long-term cancer epidemic far beyond the capacity of even the present fully-fit 
health service. In Hiroshima alone , over 2,000 people a year are still dying from 
the effects of the small and inefficient experiment conducted 37 years ago; some of 
these were not even born when the bomb went off. 
(.50M~ ~ 
500 IVU)& ., 
M,'&s 
t ' "1.0 
, 
, 
• I , 
t>\fkAnhe4CU 
I 
, , 
& • .6 __ ' 
,--' 
Figure 4. Accumulated radiation dose at 14 days from a 1 megaton groundburst 
(50% fission yield) on Birkenhead. 
l 
ATTACKS ON 
NUCLEAR 
I TALLA IONS 
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"Had nuclear power been in widespread use at the time of the last war it is likely that 
some areas of central Europe would still be uninhabitable because of ground 
contamination by caesium. " 
-Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution, 1976 
According to work done in the USA, 'centralised energy systems', of which 
nuclear power is the best example, 'are not only vulnerable but fonn essential 
industrial and hence valid military targets'; this is especially true of high power 
reactors , like those at Heysham. The Home Office states that in a war, 'many 
generating stations could be desttoyed or rendered inoperable,.7 
Nuclear installations at Dungeness, Windscale and Dounreay were deemed to 
have been hit in Operation Square Leg, and maps showing the effects of nuclear 
attacks on Barrow's nuclear submarine yards, the Chapelcross nuclear power 
station and the Windscale/Calder Hall complex have been on view in Cumbria's 
emergency planning HQ at Carlisle . The County emergency planning officer, 
Group-Captain Matthews, talking to us about this subject, stressed that plans 
made for exercises cannot be considered as targeting assumptions, and while 
agreeing that these installations would be more likely to be targeted than any town 
in Cumbria, added emphatically: "Having said that , I don't know'1 . 
The official government view, echoed by the Emrgency Planning Officer to the 
North-West Regional Health Authority, Dr. Fairfax, is that the possibility is 'not 
really a major consideration'; the additional radiation released 'from destroyed 
reactors would be 'a little added problem ... minimal compared with the rest of the 
damage that would be done'. This is wrong. Whereas 92% of the radioactivity 
from a 1 megaton bomb will be decayed after 14 days, nuclear reactors contain a 
large proportion of radioactive material which will take a generation (like stron-
tium-90 and caesium-137) or even many thousand years (like carbon-14 and 
plutonium-239) to decay to even half their original radioactivity. A 1 megaton 
bomb which destroyed a 1000 megawatt reactor would produce an area of 23,600 
square miles over which the radiation dose after a year was at least 100 rads---thirty 
times greater than that produced by a 1 megaton bomb exploding on its own. With 
all the shorter-lived radioactivity now gone, this area would diminish further only 
very slowly. 8 
Heysham Nuclear Power Station 
A nuclear power station can be destroyed in two ways: by damage of various sorts 
leading to a huge release of radiation or an uncontrollable meltdown ('The China 
Syndrome'); or by a direct hit , which will vapourise the contents and tum them 
into fallout. Figures 5 and 6 show the possible consequences if Heysham suffered 
either of these catastrophes. 
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Military planners expect that a nuclear attack on Europe would be preceded by 
a massive nuclear explosion high in the atmosphere whose electromagnetic pulse 
(EMP) would knock out communications over the entire continent and 'cause 
failure of the entire national grid, including destroying the sensitive control 
facilities at modern electric power plants' . More locally, the blast and flash from a 
1 megaton bomb five miles away could damage the vital circuits and cooling 
systems of a US-type reactor, but 'most UK reactors including Heysham do not 
have the protective outer concrete shell that most US and European reactors 
possess. They would be more easily disabled by shelling, bombing or guided 
missile attack'. Even when shut down, nuclear power stations need constant 
monitoring, manning and power supply (even if only fuel for emergency gener-
ators) to ensure that a meltdown is averted.9 
Figure 5. Destruction of Heysham 
Nuclear Power Station by a 1 megaton 
bomb: 1 day cumulative dose (rerns) 
from ground contamination to a 
person in the open, assuming a ISmph 
north-westerly wind. 
Figure 6. Meltdown of Heysham 
Nuclear Power Station: 1 day 
cumulative dose (rems) from ground 
contamination to a person in the open, 
assuming a lSmph north-westerly 
wind . 
These two diagrams are not directly comparable with figure 4, which shows the 
accumulated dose after 14 days, rather than after just one day, as here. (Adapted 
from Political Ecology Research Group). 
What could be done in such an event? According to Brian Hill, who, as Chief 
Executive of Lancashire is in charge of war/emergency planning, 
We do not see Heysham Nuclear Power Station as a likely target since 60% of 
such a detonation would be dissipated into Morecambe Bay but should it be 
subject to attack naturally there would be devastation in that area .. . although 
there would be casualties in that immediate area it would not affect the 
county's post attack administrative arrangements ... 10 
The county plan for dealing with a major peacetime accident at the plant is not 
available to the public, but it involves evacuating everybody within a kilometre-
15 
some 3,550 people-to 25 rest centres. (150,000 people live within five mIles.) The 
county's major emergency scheme could supplement this effort; it was successfully 
used to house the homeless during the 1977 floods and, believes Mr. Hill, 
There is no reason to doubt why equally effective similar operations could not 
be mounted in a wartime setting. 
Rubbish . In the first place, even in peacetime, evacuees would have to brave 
outdoor radiation and might well be safer at home. In the second place, after a 
nuclear attack, no-one is supposed to move for at least 14 days--much longer, 
with that level of radiation about. In the third place, huge areas of the region 
would be destroyed, rest centres and their potential occupants alike. In the fourth 
place, the Home Office point out that, 
Unfortunately, most buildings which are earmarked as rest centres in the event 
of a peacetime emergency, would provide poor protection in the event of fall 
out'. (ES7/1976) 
The truth is that nothing will be done; nor could it be. 
Windscale 
The nuclear reprocessing plant at Windscale houses the highly active waste from 
dozens of nuclear power stations, in cooling ponds and in vulnerable surface waste 
tanks. Constant power and expert monitoring are needed to prevent both from 
overheating and releasing their contents into the environment. According to 
Group-Captain Matthews: 
Even a major leak of radioactivity from the storage plant would be confined to 
a very small area. The damage to the population and environment which such a 
leak would cause would pale into insignificance when compared with that 
resulting from the detonation of the weapon itself. .. I really do believe that, in 
the event of a nuclear war, BNFL Windscale will prove to be the very least of 
our problems. 
Dr. Tognarelli, the secretary to the Windscale Local Liason Committee, takes a 
different view: 
The consequences of such an event (nuclear war) to the population and 
environment of West Cumbria would be of such significance that the problems 
of continuing to run the works would be overwhelmed. 
As for the possibility of a direct hit on Windscale, Group-Captain Matthews has 
written: 
I doubt whether its strategic importance would justify its inclusion in an enemy 
target listY 
As we have seen, this optimistic view has to be carefully qualified. On the 
pessimistic side, Peter Goodwin's carefully-researched book, Nuclear War: The 
Facts judges Windscale to be a strong candidate for destruction. The results would 
be catastrophic beyond imagining---see figure 7. The Medical Research Council 
recommends that in a peacetime nuclear accident, people should be evacuated 
wherever they are likely to receive a total lifetime dose of 10 rems or, in cases of 
exceptional difficulty, 25 rems. A year after the vapourising of a single one of 
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Windscale's many waste tanks, Londoners could still be receiving 50 rads a year 
(similar to rems) , having already absorbed far more. 
The effects of attacks on nuclear installations are so catastrophic that a sort of 
Geneva Convention banning them has been suggested but, writes Prof Lindop, 'it 
is unlikely to be honoured once a war has started,.12 
Figure 7. Land uninhabitable after one year (at 50 rads per year) following 
destruction of one nuclear waste storage tank at Windscale by a 1 megaton bomb. 
(Adapted from Prof Lindop). 
The Long Term 
According to Group-Captain Matthews, the aim of civil defence (or 'civil pre-
paredness:, as he prefers to call it) is 'our survival and recovery to some semblance 
of normalIty after attack', but, he adds, 'it is impossible to define what one means 
by normality'. Many eminent scientists have been trying to define 'normality' for 
the post-nuclear world. Some of their conclusions are summarised in Jonathan 
Schelfs recent book, which has already assumed historic importance, The Fate of 
the Earth. An assembly of 800 Dutch doctors concluded in 1980 that: 
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Large parts of the world would remain contaminated by radioactive fallout for 
generations. The atmosphere would be so greatly disturbed that all life on earth 
would be seriously affected. 13 
The ozone layer, which shields all living things from lethal cosmic rays, would be 
seriously disrupted for a generation, and perhaps for ever; as a result, the entire 
ecosystem on which the human race depends for all its needs would collapse. Even 
if you are in the perfect shelter, it may never be safe to come out. 
EMERGENCY 
GOVERNMENT IN 
THE NORTH-WEST 
(Information on the consequences of nuclear attack) "will be freely available except 
in the very rare cases where ... release might actually harm the security of the 
nation ... We shall be candid and we shall be outgoing. " 
-Leon Brittain, Home Affairs Minister, to the Commons, 7.8.1980 
"This is the work of a traitor." 
-Home Secretary to the Commons on the disclosure by 'Spies for Peace' of details 
of the regional system of government, 14.4.1963 
The recent publicity given to the nuclear war aspects of 'home defence' has 
?bscured its prime purpose, which is 'to secure the United Kingdom against any 
Internal threat' (ES3/1973). The main preparations are made by police and the 
military; war recovery plans, the main concern of local authorities come second. 
In 1968 the government disbanded the old Civil Defence Corps because it was 
deemed irrelevant to nuclear war. In the 1972-4 local government re-organisation, 
which conveniently brought together the boundaries of local authorities and the 
various public and emergency services, 'civil defence', peacetime 'emergency 
planning' and internal state security were brought together in a single hierarchical 
system now called 'home defence' whose main concern is to counter all forms of 
civil unrest, from strikes and rebellion to the mass resistance which may accom-
pany any state attempt to risk nuclear war. 
These plans involve replacing central government with a system of regional 
government, based round twelve regions and seventeen sub-regions, plus the 
usual counties and districts; a parallel military hierarchy takes precedence at every 
level, overseen, in theory, by the UK Commanders-in-Chief Committee (see fig 
8). This system was tested in Operations Serum Hall (1978) and Square Leg 
(1980), but both were essentially military exercises, part of NATO manoeuvres; 
among the north-western counties, only Cumbria chose to test its local civil 
defence to any great extent. 14 Operation Hard Rock, in Autumn 1982, will be the 
first national test of civil defence, though with the military acting firmly, 'in 
support'. Figure 9 shows the home defence set-up in the north-west. 
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Figure 8. Structure of emergency government in the north·west-the hierarchy of 
communication, command and control. 
The Region and Sub-region 
Lancashire, Cumbria, Manchester, Mer eyside and Cheshire comprise Region 
10. The Regional Seat of Government has been constructed within the Regional 
Armed Forces HQ at Fulwood Barracks, Preston , which will be in overall control; 
the semi-civilian RSG will not actually be activated until a month or more after the 
attack, once things are safer. The Regional Commissioner will be a senior or 
Cabinet minister, supported by a Regional Police Commander (a Chief Con-
stable , reputedly Lancashire's), a Regional Military Commander and a Regional 
Controller, and aided by 180 staff and experts of all sorts. 
Until the RSG is activated, the sub-region will be the highest level of 'civilian' 
government, headed by a junior minister or perhaps a senior pennanent civil 
servant, supported again by a controller , a police and a military commander, and a 
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staff o~ s~m~ 200. Sub-regional control (SRC) 101, covering Lancashire and 
Cumbna, IS In the basement of the government offices in Duke's House South-
port- just outside the Sub-region, and presently flooded and useless. A~rials on 
th ~ roof comm~nicate with SRC 11 at Hexham (Northumberland) , SRC 21 at 
Shlpton-by-Bemngborough (North Yorkshire) and SRC 102. SRC 102, for Man-
chester, Merseyside and Cheshire , is the old ROTOR station concrete bunker at 
~ack Green.' near Nantwich (grid ref 644478). It is being secretively and exten-
Sively refurbIshed. The authorities are saying nothing, but a call to the contractors, 
Seddon's of Stoke, brought the guarded reply that the work was 'modification to 
Crown property', while a site worker said they were 'building a shelter for the 
government' . 
TheCoWlty 
The R~gion a~d Sub-region are concerned with overall planning and resource 
allocatIOn, while the small district authorities are concerned with mobilising local 
efforts. I n between, the County Controller and his staff have very wide emergency 
powers ~nd respons.ibilities. The Region's five county controls and their standbys, 
none of them partIcularly impregnable, are shown on the map. Manchester's 
Cheadle control, ~or example , could easily be disabled or destroyed by an attack in 
the area.' accordmg to the. emergency planning officer, Bernard Hayes. ls The 
Merseyslde county control IS an 'old civil defence building' under the Walker Art 
G allery, possibly dating back to World War II. Lancashire's is in a semi-under-
ground bunker at Westleigh, the existing emergency planning HQ and one of the 
three 'forward controls' under the old civil defence system (the others were at 
Rawtenstall Police HQ and Haydock Civil Hall). It was 'constructed at a modest 
cost in 1962.to house, in the main, communication equipment and associated 
st~ff', and will hold about 100 people, 'one third from county council and two 
thIrds from g?vernment departments, and other public authorities'. The county 
standby HQ, In the basement beneath committee room B in Lancaster Town Hall 
was repor,tedly reinforced in 1980 and would hold 80 people, but ' the protectio~ 
offered WIll be no greater than that to be found in a private house'- albeit a very 
larg~. one . Although these are the only two shelters for staff (without their 
famIlies), the county emergency planning officer has suggested that County Hall in 
Preston ~ould be used later if possible; an emergency electricity supply and a new 
electromc telephone exchange were installed in 1978-9.16 
The . county chie~ .executive will normally be the county controller, working 
alongsld~ ~ounty mllttary and police commanders and supported , in order to ease 
the t:ansltlOn to unrepresentative government, by a committee of three council-
lors 10 whom the full powers of the council will theoretically be vested . These will 
normally be t~e three most senior chairmen-in Cumbria, for example, those of 
the fu~l councIl, the policy and resources committee and the public protection 
co~mlttee. The county controller will have immense powers, relating particularly 
to law and order' ; at least two county controllers hav admitted the v will have the 
authority to kill people ('summary execution '). 17 J 
Unusually , .the eivi! side of Lancashire 's emergency plans have already had a 
thorough testIng, dUIlng the coastal floods of November 1977. The Chief Execu-
tive took co~trol and 'a good liason was established with the County Departments, 
the LancashIre Constabulary, Voluntary Aid Societies, industry, public utilities, 
and the Military'. A~l went well , but certain problems boded ill for the system's 
chances of dealmg WIth a nuclear attack. The police found that 'Operations were 
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hampered by darkness, which made accurate reconnaissance almost impossible . 
The county surveyor's department had 'communications difficulties' with its emer-
hampered by darkness, which made accurate reconnaissance almost impossible'-
the county surveyor's department had 'communications difficulties' with its emer-
gency centre, while the council found it had only one lorry big enough to rescue 
cars from flood water. 18 Ina nuclear attack, the emergency planning office reckons 
on the extra problem of there being some 560,000 dead out of a population of 1.4 
million, but this is based only on the discredited government guideline that 2/3 of 
the country might survive given basic protection; the county, like every other, is 
'not privy to government assumptions about target patterns'-a hopeless state of 
affairs for local war planners to have to contend with. 19 
District and below 
Districts will be administered along similar lines to counties, but with smaller 
staffings and more immediate local problems in mind. The Chief Executive of each 
district council is the 'District Controller (designate)' and will normally operate 
from the safest part of the authority'S peacetime offices. Known district controls 
include Oldham Civic Centre, Swinton Town Hall, Bolton Town Hall and Lan-
caster Town Hall, the latter two also designated as county standby HQs. Some 
districts, such as Lancaster, have not yet nominated their war officers, but Bolton 
Council's Management and Finance Committee led the way as early as June 1975, 
and came up with the following list: 
District Controller-Chief Executive 
District Food Officer-Director of Education 
District Food Distribution and Emergency Feeding Officers---Education Dept. officers, to 
be nominated by the Director of Education 
Transport Officer-Director of Engineering 
Intelligence and Information Officer-Public Relations Officer 
Communications Officer-Director of Administration 
Scientific Advisor-To be nominated by Director of Education 
Officer for Health, Sanitation and Refuse-Director of Environmental Health 
Officer for Billeting and Care of the Homeless---Director of Housing 
Officer for Works of Repair and Demolition-Director of Architecture 
Officer for Rescue-Director of Engineering 
Officer for Burial of the Dead-Director of Recreation 
The school meals service makes the education department important for emer-
gency feeding while, in the blackest of ironies, his responsibility for parks and 
cemeteries leaves the director of recreation in charge of the corpses. Other 
designations, where known, are similar. By way of variety, Stockport has desig-
nated its Principal Electrical Engineer (Town Planning) as District Communi-
cations Officer. Salford's Technical Services Officer becomes the Rescue Officer, 
while the job of Information Officer goes to the Cultural Services Manager.2o 
The district will keep in touch with its people by using the existing ward or parish 
organisation. In Lancaster, for example, the polling station in each of the 29 wards 
will become a 'local control', while six schools become 'group controls' to link the 
local controls with the Town Hall. In Cumbria, things are slightly different; in each 
of the six districts the group controls are replaced by several 'desks' within the 
district control, each dealing with a group of wards or parishes. 
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Although the district organisations of the various emergency services are best 
able to help people on the ground, they are only useful to the higher authorities in 
so far as they help maintain some sort of stability in the region. They are firmly at 
the bottom of the pecking order when it comes to vital services and supplies, and 
the answer to public anger, unrest and panic is more likelv to be repression than 
relief. 
Finance 
County emergency planning budgets in the north-west vary from 6p per head in 
Lancashire l£90,OOO) and 8p per head in Manchester (£216,000) to 25p per head in 
Cumbria (£117,000, of which £15,000 goes to the police). Per head comparisons 
can be misleading----Cumbria has high travel costs and a small population----but in 
no case does the money pay for significantly more than a planning staff and their 
various expenses. Counties find their way round this to some extent by relying on 
voluntary organisations and by recruiting volunteer scientific advisors from 
amongst local experts. These will man district and county controls to help monitor 
fallout, as well as giving various advice in peacetime; Cumbria has 29 advisors. 
Cheshire reportedly over 60. Cumbria also runs an ambitious programme to train 
1 % of the adult population-some 2-3,000 people-as wartime Community 
Advisors. 480 have qualIfied to date and another 130 have followeo courses, but 
the council recently put a drastic brake on the programme. (A report in Municipal 
Engineering that the community advisors would be used to 'identify pacifists and 
lefties' was later withdrawn by the magazine (5 May and 30 June 1981) and it is not 
county policy, but it must be admitted that they would be a potentially valuable 
source of such information in a crisis, whether officially or not). 
In short, the civil defence budgets for the whole of the north-west can pay only 
for limited planning, training and advice, often constrained to rely on corrupt 
Home Office guidelines; there is no money for any public equipment, stores or 
sheltering. 
COMMUNICATIONS 
Public Infonnation 
The state has already decided what we will be told in the period before a war. At 
first, 'the emphasis would be on assurances that everything possible was being 
done to prevent war and on references to the effectiveness of the nuclear deter-
rent' (if you can't spot the difference with the present official line, start worrying). 
Later, t.he wartime broadcasting service, transmitted partly from sub-regional 
HQs, will broadcast protection information designed to make people stay put and 
occupy themselves calmly with shelter-building and other displacement activities. 
It is also suggested that local planners should 'identify, but not at this stage 
a,?proach' 'reliable' wartime public information officers---at county level, 'men 
(SIC) of some standing ... press or public relations officers would be suitable', while 
locally, council staff, teachers, librarians, PR and press people, citizens' advice 
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bureau staff ... Lancashire has not earmarked anyone yet, but other counties may 
have done, and you could be one of them. The while aim of official information 
policy is to avoid creating 'alarm and despondency'---one reason why the 1976 
edition of the official pamphlet Protect and Survive was marked 'not to be 
distributed, sold or shown to the public in normal peacetime'. Part of the reason 
for its issue in 1980 may have been that the reduced warning period now 
expected-between two days and a week, as opposed to a month or more pr~vi­
ously- would not be long enough to distribute it. Cumbria's emergency plannmg 
officer, who is committed to effective 'civil preparedness' , has described Protect 
and Survive as 'inadequate' but he has warned the Public Protection Committee 
(ironically in a memo marked 'CONFIDENTIAL. For Members Only') that in 
giving out alternative information, 'great care should be exercised if we are to 
avoid spreading alarm and despondency unnecessarily' .21 
In short, official information is designed to persuade people to 'stay put' and not 
to flee, riot or panic, even though following such advice would be a death sentence 
to those in likely target areas. It is perhaps not too cynical to suggest that this is 
deliberate; neither the system nor the food supply could cope with vast wandering 
bands of survivors. 
Telephone Communications 
Communications between emergency HQs rely heavily on the telephone trunk 
cable network, which in the early 1960s was 
relaid away from the likely targets to guard against nuclear attack. A striking 
example is perhaps the underwater cable from Colwyn Bay to Heysham, 
bypassing the Liverpool-Manchester conurbation which is almost certain to be 
a target. 
In a war or internal emergency, the Post Office Telephone Preference System can 
cut off 95% of subscribers, so that they can only receive calls, while giving priority 
to, on the first rank, lines 'vital to the prosecution of the war and to national 
survival' and, on the second, lines 'necessary to maintain the life of the community 
in a peacetime emergency'. Thus, the authorities gain secure communications 
while at the same time cutting off millions of potential 'subversives' from contact 
with one anotller as the state regroups itself. The role of restricted communi-
cations in combatting subversion is also shown in the way in which the lines 
required to tap our telephone system are routed through the secret defence 
communications system to prevent Post Office engineers from recognising the 
system.22 
Lancaster telephone exchange contains a semi-underground secret emergency 
switching room, apparently with considerable capacity; although it doesn't offici-
ally exist, it is common knowledge amongst staff. 
The telephone system is, of course, vulnerable to demage by EMP, but protec-
tion is not always easy. Recently there was an exercise in protecting vital lines at 
Carnforth exchange with portable lead blocks; it was supposed to be an emergency 
procedure, but the blocks were so cumbersome it took two days. 
Radio 
Fortunately, the region's authorities have radio to fall back on. Emergency HOs 
have separate radio communications, as do the various emergency services and 
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Figure 10. Important emergency communications links and relays in the north-
west. 
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public utilities. These rely for,their wider coverage on the Home Office network of 
hilltop radio stations which are recognisable by their two very tall masts, rising 
next to small brick and concrete control rooms with visible air filters. Those used in 
the Royal Observer Corps network are marked on figure 10 ; the rest are listed in 
appendix C. Pye Telecommunications (who operate the back-up aerial for 
Lancaster's fire, police and ambulance at Langthwaite) are currently wiring up the 
new 'MOULD' system, which by the end of 1983 will give Regional Military 
Commanders access to the. existing emergency services radio net to back up their 
landline communications.23 
The Microwave System 
The Post Office supplements its cable network with a system of microwave towers 
which, double-routed away from likely targets, 'offers great capacity with high 
security'. The system carries 1V signals as well as thousands of telephone lines; 
the network in the north-west is shown in figure 10 . (Gas and electric boards, the 
USAF and Air Traffic Control each have separate, smaller microwave systems; 
these are not shown). 
The microwave system is more than just a secure system of emergency com-
munications, for Britain is Europe's major centre of international communi-
cations. A huge network of undersea cables and satellite stations feeds into the 
UK microwave system, which in turn carries a number of extra routes converging 
on the tower at Hunters Stones, near Harrogate, and from there by cable to the 
nearby secret US National Security Agency base at Menwith Hill---'America's big 
ear on Europe'. One of these special links, built in 1963, links Hunters Stones with 
Lancaster at Quernmore, via Proctor Heights and Thornton-in-Lonsdale (near 
Ingleton), and continues to the Isle of Man with possible links to Ireland and 
elsewhere. In 1977 Steve Wright, a researcher at Lancaster University, was 
arrested and questioned (but not charged) by the Special Branch because of his 
correspondence with Duncan Campbell---one of the journalists accused of 
'spying' in the farcical ABC trial at the time-about the Quernmore microwave 
tower. The US/British system of international eavesdropping has enabled the two 
countries in the past to monitor the international activities of the anti-Vietnam war 
movement and to make important interventions in international affairs . In a 
pre-war 'period of rising tension' we can be sure that this monitoring system, 
including the Lancaster link, would be humming with activity to counter diplo-
matic and 'subversive' moves alike which threatened the prosecu tion of the war. 24 
The U.K. Warning and Monitoring Organisation 
(UKWMO) 
The UKWMO exists to warn of, and to monitor, enemy attacks on Britain. On the 
one hand, It is connected with Strike Command. On the other hand, it is 
connected with Royal Observer Corps, whose volunteers monitor nuclear bursts 
and fallout from 873 underground monitoring posts in the UK. The information 
from these is collated in 25 'group controls'. Two of these are in the north-west: 
no. 22 next door to RAF Carlisle, and no. 21 at Langley Lane, Goosnargh, near 
Preston, which is also the UKWMO's Western Sector Control. The immense 
bunker here has recently been undergoing extensive renovation, as the photo-
graphs show; site workers say it contains four floors and numerous beds. Nearby is 
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the joint Ministry of Defence! Air Traffic Control radar station at Whittingham 
Lane, and further down the lane is another bunker of unknown purpose, 
equipped with heavy blast protection and a lift. 
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The group controls pass their information on to the military, to sub-regional 
HQs, and to 250 'carrier control points', mostly in police stations, which in turn 
alert 18,000 'warning points' (sirens) and 4,000 'warning recipients' (civil defence 
HQs, hospitals, public utilities etc.) Lancashire's sirens are activated from a 
control room in the country police HQ in Hutton. An officer at Menwith Hill, 
however, is on record as saying that he does not believe that either the four of the 
thirty minute warn' will sound. 
Royal Observer Corps monitoring post, Kendal. (See appendix B). 
Although the ROC has been accused, with some justification, of complicity in 
war preparations, its volunteers' thankless task would be important even in a 
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Britain without nuclear weapons. Potential recruits from schools in the More-
cam be area who are shown round a local monitoring post are sworn to secrecy 
about its location, and such information is often regarded as 'classified', but there 
is no need for all this , since the ROC's official history contains a full list of its sites 
(see appendix B).25 
Electro-Magnetic Pulse (EMP) 
There is every reason to believe that a Soviet attack on Europe would be preceded 
by an atmospheric nuclear explosion whose violent instantaneous EMP would 
knock out unprotected communications across the continent: 
Present emergency services radio systems are all vulnerable, as are all boosted 
telephone lines (for example, the British system), all unprotected computers, 
all wide band width radio systems (these are especially vulnerable but are now 
being adopted by the emergency services) and virtually all equipment contain-
ing sensitive electronics and wire circuitry. 26 
British civil defence has only just woken up to this, and local planners (Bernard 
Hayes in Manchester , and the regional water board and health authority) now talk 
manfully about using 'runners' to carry messages and maroons to warn of fallout 
(though how the maroon operators get their information is not explained). The 
Regional Health Authority has a modest 'ongoing programme' to keep computers 
and other electrical equipment in tin boxes, behind cellar walls, or simply un-
plugged when not in use but, doubtless like everyone else, has no money for any 
proper measures. The simple truth is that without the vulnerable electronic 
communications on which it so heavily relies, the region's civil defence will not 
function. 
THE AFTERMATH 
"Two or three weeks after the nuclear attack a situation might arise in which 
hundreds of thousands of people were living in grossLy overcrowded and often 
temporary accommodation, on a dull and largely inadequate diet, on an inadequate 
and potentially contaminated water suppLy and in insanitary conditions worse than 
those found in the poorest and most overcrowded areas of the under-developed 
countries. " 
-DHSS circular HDC (77)1 
" It would be unrealistic to think of extensive life-saving in the immediate aftermath 
of a nuclear attack. Present plans are based on a regime of minimum exposure to 
fallout and the need to ensure that essential workers are not exposed unnecessarily to 
the risk of radiation injury." 
-Home Office circular ES3/1978 
"We must recognise that people die in days or weeks: it takes months or years to 
restructure resources. " 
-Crucible of Despair 
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The second set of official instructions above applies to the 'hardest hit areas' which 
are defined in ES7/1973 as those where 60% of the people survive a fortnight after 
the attack; these would arguably be the lightest hit areas. Even the cautious 
approach shown in the second quote will prove disastrous. Official guidelines state 
that people can safely absorb up to 150 rads of radiation in two days and 10 rads a 
day thereafter, an assertion for which 
there is no published scientific evidence .. . it appears that emergency personnel 
in post-attack conditions will be expected to accumulate, as a matter of course, 
near lethal acute radiation exposures. 
Furthermore, Home Office guidelines, on which all the emergency plans for the 
north-west which we have investigated appear to be based, do not seriously 
consider that an attack may occur in the depths of winter , or that it may be 
repeated over weeks or months, or that nuclear installations may be hit ,. or that 
chemical and biological weapons may be used, or that EMP may wIpe out 
communications, or the devastating psychological effects which the experience 
will have on the survivors. This last is vital. Far from being animated by 'Dunkirk 
spirit' , people at Hiroshima wandered aimlessly or fled blindly, often leaving 
friends and family behind; pre-arranged rescue teams did not form. Many sur-
vivors were mentally 'destroyed' and have never recovered. Yet whereas in 
Hiroshima, outside rescue teams arrived and people began to return, in a widely 
devastated region, this would not happen. Probably, survivors would need to form 
armed bands and tribes and any remaining shreds of government would need to 
resort to totalitarian controls (though, as we shall see, what is actually being 
planned is not far different from this)Y 
With these considerations in mind---or rather, temporarily forgetting them how 
would the emergency services in the north-west cope with a small local holocaust? 
TBEBEALTB 
SERVICE 
" Hospitals should, initially, accept only those casualties who, after limited surgical 
procedures, would be likely to be alive after seven days, with a chance of eventual 
recovery .. . people suffering from radiation sickness only should not be admitted. " 
-DHSS circular HDC(77)1 
"All the dying would want is a bit of tender loving care. " 
-Home Defence College war game organiser 
The Region 
In 1981 the government allocated £500,000 for the appointment of health service 
'war planning officers' by the simple measure of wit holding part of each region's 
I 
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normal budget unless this was done. In September, th~ North V:e~t ~egional 
Health Authority appointed Dr Charles Fairfax as ' Reglon~l Speclah~t In Com-
munity Medicine (Emergency Planning),.28 He freely admlt~ that thIS £35,000 
budget is 'inadequate'; it will only support two or three staff w~th no money even 
for such basic tasks as surveying hospital buildings for blast resistance. Hence .the 
strategy is simply to organise a sort of b.asic sw:'i~abili~y into the health service, 
rather than to plan expensive protection. Wlthm thIS scheme, however, Dr 
Fairfax's approach is quite sophisticated. . 
The computers which exist in each county control Will be used to keep tra.ck of 
surviving resources, such as hospital beds, and generally, remar.ks Dr FaIrfax , 
'we're thinking of this degree of sophistication' . If these and their back-ups are 
destroyed by EMP (see above), local hi-fi shops could be looted to provide 
alternatives. The region has several dispersed printouts of doctors and their phone 
numbers----doctors are on the second rank of the telephone preference system, 
hospitals on the first-and to find a doctor, health officers would simply ring down 
the list until one answered. Although stocks of bandages, blood, plasma and drugs 
would rapidly be exhausted, there are no special stockpiles in the region, since 
' there are no resources for that kind of expenditure'; in any case, drugs don't keep. 
Cambridge and East Anglia accordingly rely on 'cottage medicine', 'self-help' and 
herbal remedies (although East Anglia has reportedly since dropped the herbal 
side of this). As Dr Fairfax points out, herbs couldn't cure many nuclear casual-
ties. In any case, they grow in seasons: 'you couldn't just go out and grow a crop of 
digitalis (foxglove) if you needed it' . Such schemes are 'utter nonsense and totally 
unrealistic'. Instead, says Dr Fairfax, 'I look at chemical works with a greedy eye 
from the point of view of using them to revive civilisation ' . The north-west has a 
large chemical industry (though how much would survive a nuclear attack is 
doubtful) and companies are being asked to earmark part of their stocks of certain 
chemicals for post-war use, since some basic drugs can be synthesised at bench-top 
level. Breweries , which grow yeast, could be used to grow penicillin. All in all , 
believes Dr Fairfax, 'we could cope if the bombs went off in different places, but 
we couldn't deal with it if a large number of bombs went off in one place'. 
Lancaster-a local case study 
Lancaster's health plan was drawn up , without any financial aid, in 1980 and 
therefore has none of the vulnerable sophistications of more recent regional plans. 
It became a model for the county's other five district health authorities--Preston, 
Ormskirk, Blackpool , Blackburn and Burnley- although Lancaster has certain 
special advantages. It is not a likely target , unless Heysham is hit, and as a major 
centre of health care it has three hospitals , two large mental hospitals and some 
4,000 doctors, nurses, paramedics , care staff and administrators to draw upon. 
H ow will Lancaster's unusually well-placed health service cope with a nuclear 
war? 
Immediate aid will be based on 38 First Aid Posts (FAPs--one per ward control 
plus nine extra to cater for the country districts), manned by volunteers such as the 
St John 's Ambulance Brigade and WRVS, with some non-practising nurses. They 
will provide a local focus for the injured and will give very basic first aid before 
passing patients on to one of six Casualty Collection Centres (CCCs). The CCCs 
will be schools at or near local authority Group Controls, and will be manned by 
nurses, dentists, volunteers, even chiropodists and opticians--in fact, 'almost 
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anyone who is not frightened of blood'. They provide further treatment and s~lect 
those to be admitted to hospitals. The district's 20 ambulances will ferry patIents 
between F APs, CCCs and hospitals if there is any petrol available. 'Doctors would 
be an absolute luxury' and would be confined to hospitals; they would work 8-hour 
shifts, considered the useful maximum, but would also do house calls---their work 
load will be tremendous. Hospital admissions will be based on the 'triage' system 
invented to cope with the unprecedented battlefield casualties of World War L 
only those who are likely to survive will be admitted. People who will probabl~ 
not die will be treated at F APs and CCCs and sent home, while the doomed will 
simply pile up. To enforce this system , hospitals will be guarded by the police and 
will only admit from CCCs, while CCCs will (in theory) admit only from FAPs, 
and be guarded by 'bouncers in all but name'. . . 
In the pre-attack period, CCCs and F APs will be open to make people famIlIar 
with them. They will then close, along with the hospitals, and F APs will open first, 
followed by CCCs and finally, after a fortnight or more, the hospitals. Unfortun-
ately, the local health service depends entirely on other authorities for radiation 
advice which, as has been shown, may not materialise and may in any case prove 
fatally misleading. 
Before the attack, the hospitals will send patients home to make room for 
casualties; the DHSS recommends 70% of maternity cases, 60% of acute cases, 
50% of non-active infections, 15% of psychiatric cases and all convalescents, 
whatever their condition. Only emergency cases and women needing caesarian 
sections will be admitted. In Lancaster, Beaumont and Queen Victoria hospitals 
will have to close completely for the attack, while the Infirmary and the Moor, 
both much older and with extensive tunnel and cellar accommodation, will remain 
open with a skeleton staff of volunteers---volunteers because staff cannot .be 
expected to leave their families. The Albert hospital, likewise old and extendmg 
underground, will become the centre for the city's mental patients, taking many 
from the Moor while its own 800 complement will have to be reduced by half-a 
measure which staff consider impossible, since most patients cannot look after 
themselves and have nowhere else to go. Mental patients, it seems, are a big 
unsolved problem. 
The Moor Hospital, since it has cellars and the district emergency services radio 
transmitter (the back-up is at Langthwaite) provides a natural HQ for the locc:! 
health service's war officers, who are as follows: 
War designation 
District Health Director 
Senior Nurse 
Administrator 
Treasurer 
Works Officer 
plus supporting staff" 
Dietician 
Pharmacist 
Catering Officer 
Catering staff 
Telephonist 
2-3 personal secretaries 
Current civilian job 
Community Health Officer 
District Nursing Officer 
District Administrator 
District Treasurer 
District Works Officer 
District Dietician 
District Pharmacist 
Moor Hospital Catering Officer 
Moor Hospital catering staff 
(Each officer has a designated deputy; details will vary between districts) . 
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These officers will also run the Moor Hospital. The other hospitals will be run by a 
triumvirate of a director (an administrator), a senior doctor and a senior nurse, 
with similar supporting staff. 
The standby health service HQ is at the Community Health Offices, Slyne 
Road, from where the district's 600-700 personal radios are controlled (or will be 
in 1983, when this system begins). Doctors and nurses, however, will stay at home, 
having been told where to report after attack through their computerised monthly 
pay slips, assuming a pay day can be arranged during the 'period of rising tension'. 
Such a move was reportedly considered after the 1980 Russian invasion of Afghan-
istan, but was not implemented for fear of causing alarm. Lancaster has a modest 
stockpile of drugs, regularly turned over, believed to have been begun some ten 
years ago, perhaps at the time of the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. Stocks of vaccine, 
however, are limited; barely enough, for example, to immunise health service 
staff against typhoid and diptheria--some 4,000 shots at most. With disease likely 
to be rife from dead bodies, polluted water and plagues of vermin (which develop 
immunities and breed quickly in such uncontrolled conditions), the outlook even 
for initially healthy survivors looks bleak. 
A Direct Bit 
As figure 7 shows a one megaton bomb on Lancaster would destroy all five 
hospitals; one on Heysham would very probably do the same, regardless of the 
catastrophic radiation effects. In the event of a direct hit, five other casualty 
collecting centres might be established at Bailrigg, Galgate, Hornby, Silverdale 
and Borwick, and an emergency operating theatre may be set up at St John's 
Hospital, Silverdale, although damaged roads and bridges would seriously 
hamper the transport of survivors even if fuel and transport were still available. 
Official guidelines rule out help between districts; some districts may bravely 
ignore this. 
The vulnerability of Lancaster's health service to a direct hit is not at all unusual, 
given the sheer power of modern weapons and the NHS's long-standing policy of 
centralisation, which war planning has done nothing to change. (The same goes 
for hospital design; Barrow's new hospital has been built, entirely above ground). 
In Birkenhead, as a local consultant in emergency care has pointed out, 'most of 
the hospitals would be completey demolished or seriously damaged by the attack. 
I can't see any way they could provide a useful service at all'. All nine of Sheffield's 
hospitals would be flattened by a single nuclear bomb. 29 
The ethical problems of planning for nuclear war, particularly of sorting casual-
ties so as to condemn many potential survivors to death, have led many confer-
ences of eminent physicians round the world to declare that nuclear war is 
medically untreatable, and that the only possible cure is prevention, in the form of 
disarmament. Comparing the best efforts being made in the under-financed, 
over-technological and over-centralised health service in the north west with the 
likely minimum of nuclear damage, one can only agree with them. 
FOOD 
"Most local authorities are incapable o/implementing the present procedures." 
-Institute for Civil Defence study of emergency feeding, 1980 
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A government which can organise itself a near-monopoly on food supplies wields 
enormous power in a war or insurrection. The main effect of the current emer-
gency feeding .system will be to give it this power; food will be supplied, but 
probably only m return for work or good behaviour. There are two sides to the 
system: supply, which will be mainly organised by Regions and Sub-Regions; and 
distribution, which will mainly be the concern of counties and districts. 
Supply 
In peacetime, the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (MAFF) oversees 
emergency planning. The north-west is covered by three regional offices (in 
Newcastle, Leeds and Wolverhampton); these will apparently be absorbed into 
Regional and Sub-regional government. MAFF already has a number of semi-
secret food buffer depots in the region (see appendix A) which contain stocks of 
'flo~r, yeast, sugar,. refined fat and special biscuits', plUS emergency feeding 
eqUIpment. These Will need to be supplemented by other stocks which MAFF will 
lay in nearer the time, using emergency powers to requisition farm and other 
supplies. Regional government will take control of MAFF flour mills and mobile 
bakeries and also of ports, and therefore of grain stores and any future imports. In 
the longer term, MAFF will try to control and regenerate agriculture. Food stocks 
of all sorts will be distributed to local authorities via MAFF distribution points. In 
Cumbria, there is one to each district: 
Allerdale 
Barrow 
Carlisle 
Copeland 
Eden 
S. Lakeland 
Lilleyhall Industrial Estate, 
Workington 
ASDA supermarket 
Durranhill Industrial Estate 
Richmond Estate, Whitehaven 
Gilwilly Estate, Penrith 
Mintsfeet Industrial Estate, Kendal 
grid ref 
016247 
192697 
415550 
992173 
509304 
520942 
Cum bria has an extra problem, in that MAFF buffer depots are generally concen-
trated near large population centres, which the county, with roughly 5-10 buffer 
depots, lacks: the problem is being looked at. 
Distribution 
There will be no time before an attack to introduce rationing. Afterwards, there 
will not be enough food or enough organisation for rationing, but in any case, food 
will be a useful carrot which the authorities can use to gain control of survivors. 
As war approaches, local authorities will lay in previously earmarked food 
stocks for their various HQs, activating 'dormant contracts' with suppliers and 
requisitioning food from warehouses and supermarkets--perhaps interfering with 
people's attempts to lay in the 14 days' supply which they will be assumed to have. 
Lancaster is believed to have plans to slaughter cattle and place the meat in 
dispersed refrigerators, such as in butchers' shops (though a power failure could 
mar this strategy). Fourteen days after the attack, emergency feeding will (hope-
fully) begin. Local controllers will transport food from distribution points to 
emergency feeding centres in schools, run by people from the education authori-
ties; these centres in many cases double as 'local' or 'group' administrative 
, 
\ 
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controls, first aid posts, casualty collecting centres, community centres, or all of 
th~se. The school me.als service and voluntary organisations will do the feeding, 
usmg emergency eq~lpment from MAFF such as the 'Soyer Boiler', invented in 
the 1840s to cop~ ~It? the Irish potato famine. The 1960s emergency feeding 
manuals were optimistic about what could be provided: 
I Breakfast I 
1 _________________ 1 
Porridge 
Bread or Biscuits 
Margarine 
Jam, Marmalade 
or Syrup 
Tea 
Dinner 
Shepherds Pie 
Cabbage, Roast Potatoes 
Boiled Fruit Pudding 
Bread 
Tea or Coffee 
Supper 
Tomato Soup 
Bread 
Margarine 
Tea or Cocoa EnjOYing the nuclear challenge: the 
1981 WRVS practice with 1840's 
boilers. 
The current aim is to provide 20 million people in Britain with 'half a pint of 
stew-type meal' a day, cooked with burning rubbish; Cumbria hopes to add a cup 
of tea a day. The government reportedly estimates that people could survive on 
this sort of diet for two years. 
The Long Term 
Major disasters in the world are often followed by plagues and famine which may 
kill more than the original catastrophe. Nuclear war is no exception. 
In the long term, MAFF, aided by local authorities, will aim to regenerate 
agriculture, but there are massive problems: radioactive ground contamination 
being absorbed by crops and animals; livestock dying from the effects of radiation; 
seed , fertiliser and pesticides lacking (modern agriculture has evolved to depend 
upon them); hordes or desperate people plundering farms and food stocks; 
uncontrollable plagues of vermin and disease; and doubtless many more unfor-
36 
seen difficulties. With many other countries also destroyed or suffering from the 
effect.s of nuclear .war on climate and environment, there would be little hope of 
food Imports, which at present meet half of Britain's requirements. It has been 
calculated that a~y si~ifica!lt civil protection plans, even those simple ones which 
the government ImagInes wI~1 mean 15 million fewer dead, would only increase the 
number of short-term survivors even further above the land's ability to feed 
them. 30 
WATER 
"It can be said with absolute assurance that any widespread nuclear attack would 
quickly disrupt the distribution system for domestic and industrial water and much 
of the sewerage system... It should be assumed that in all areas there will be 
prolonged disruption. " 
-Home Office circular ES6/1976 
"If so"!eone wanted to knock us for six, he'd knock our water supply for six ... 
Water IS one of the strongest arguments against nuclear war. " 
-Dr Fairfax, Emergency Planning Officer, NW Health Authority 
Supply 
The north-~est ~as two main systems of water supply. Water from the recent 
(1980) Conjunctive use scheme, which now supplies most of Manchester comes 
from the Lune-Wyre-Ribble pipeline system , the Fylde boreholes, and Sto~ks and 
B.arnacre reservOirs. Apart from the reservoirs, this system relies on heavy pum-
pIng, and on treatment at Franklaw and Catterall; it could not function after a 
nucl~ar attack. ~ater from Thirlmere and Hazelmere, on the other hand, is fed by 
gravity, and w.hIle Haz.e~ere water is chlorinated at Watchgate, Thirlmere water 
needs only micro-straInIng. This system would provide the region's main post-
attack supply. 
~he region also ~as betw~en 250 and 300 small underground service reservoirs, 
which r~gulate d~Ily supplies; the biggest, at Prescot, holds 50 million gallons. 
These might proVide useful emergency supplies. Because people will need to stock 
up, and because the main problem anyway will be distribution rather than conser-
va~ion, water will not be cut off before an attack. However, some service reser-
VOlfS have two separate tanks, one of which could be held back until after the 
attack. In addition, there will b~ emergency powers to requisition private springs, 
w~lls and boreholes a~though In practice the water boards generally find that 
pnvate sources .are of h~tle use. The Department of the Environment keep stocks 
of. water ~U~PIng eqUipment. The many storage tanks attached to public and 
pnvate bUildIngs could prove useful short-term sources if they survived· those at 
Lancaster's hospitals contain 20-30 days supply. ' 
Problems 
!he Th~rlmere pipeline, although three feet underground, is 'by no means 
Immune to blast damage. Urban pipes would simply be wrecked and water would 
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just leak away. Until makeshift repairs by local work parties could be organised, 
cutting off supplies would be very important. This can only be done manually, and 
is important enough for staff engaged on it to have personal radiation dosimeters, 
which is rare outside the police force-even most doctors won't have them. This 
work, however, requires transport and communications, whereas fuel would be 
scarce and the water authority's 10-20 channel radio system is not protected 
against EMP. As one water board planner told us , 'if the radio doesn 't work, the 
man's just going to have to get on his bike and pedal from one place to the next' . 
There will, of course, be much less sewage to deal with, and although most 
sewage works rely on pumped water and would fail, a few simple filter plants could 
keep going. Sewage would leak into water supplies, but fortunately, the north-
west does not rely much on rivers and springs--at least , in normal times. 'On the 
whole', believes the water authority, 'the sewage works could cope'. However, 
what ceased to be a problem for the water authority would become one for public 
health. 
...... But how will 
he drink his tea ... 1 
Radiation cannot be removed from water by boiling, or otherwise destroyed; it 
just has to decay naturally. The official view is that radi?active particles co.uld be 
removed from water by letting it stand, and then remOVIng the scum or sediment. 
The micro-strainers which alone filter the Thirlmere supply are 'not particularly 
efficient' at removing radioactivity and there are no plans to cover reservoirs 
against fallout. Dr Fairfax, the north-west regional health authority'S emergency 
planner points out that 'if you have to have water to survive, you'd be willing to 
take in quite a lot of radioactivity', 'probably not as much as ten tim~s' ~he 
peacetime limits, but it would depend on circumstances: 'local contamInation 
could be a millionfold' , and long-lived radiation would be a permanent danger. 
'Until chlorination could be effected', writes the Home Office, 'boiling small 
amounts of drinking water would be the public's only safeguard against bacterial 
38 
pollution ... Immediate post-attack consumption might be based on a litre per 
pe~son per day'~not even enough to drink, especially for the sick and injured . 
~Ith. corpses 1~I.ng ~n the g~oun~, people living in 'overcrowded and grossly 
Insamtary conditions , and epidemiCS such as typhoid and cholera rife , pure water 
would be r~re. The water board and the government believe that water pollution 
from chemical warfare would be minimal, since the dilution in reservoirs would be 
enormous; but no sophisticated monitoring would be po sible, and bacterial 
warfare would be a different matter. 
The North West Water Authority has between 50 and 75 mobile tankers each 
hol~ing u~ to 4,500 gallons, and 150-200 smaller trailers, while many other s~rts of 
vehicle might be pressed to carry water. High axle, four-wheel drive Bedford 
water carriers are kept at food buffer depots and Home Office Supply and 
Transp?rt Depots. 31 Even so , this could only cater for some drinking water, even 
SUppOSIn¥ there was enough fuel. Emergency mobile generators are kept pru-
dentlya lIttle way outside the major cities of Preston, Manchester, Liverpool and 
Crewe , and would rely on diesel (which would be especially tightly controlled) to 
power pumps and treatment units. The Fylde boreholes do have large standing 
emergency generators , but using them in such a fuel shortage would almost 
certainly be out of the question. 
The North West Water Authority'S war plans are drawn up at the authority'S 
Warrington HQ by Mr R .B. Stannard and Mr C.H. Batty, who have general 
responsibility for all sorts of emergency plans. Mr Batty would probably work, 
along with other water experts, at county or sub-regional level, but the regional 
controller of water would be the current director of operations, Alan Riley. The 
region seems to be fortunate in its water supply compared with, say , London, but 
plans can only do so much to defend against nuclear war, and the only thing that 
can be guaranteed is acute shortage in all the areas affected by the attack, and 
very, very slow recovery. 
Viewers of The War Game who were shocked to see firemen being sucked into a 
fire storm while vainly attempting to combat the effects of a nuclear attack can rest 
assured: there will be no early firefighting in bombed areas . Even in peacetime, 
the North West Water Authority sometimes has trouble supplying the fire service . 
and there is no large scale emergency water scheme' to supply it in wartime. One 
fire engine using up to 18 000 gallons a minute causes water pressure to fall over an 
area, so fighting many fires in one place would be difficult, even, upposing mains 
were intact, which they would not be. 
The Home Office is quite clear that 'planning is directed towards the preser-
vation of the fire service' . Fortunately, fire stations are naturally dispersed, and 
before an attack, half the fire services' equipment would be further dispersed, 
supplemented by Home Office pumps and vehicles. Although there will obviously 
be close liason with emergency government and the military fire services--Lanca 
shire's county fire brigade HQ is in Fulwood, bear the Anned Forces HQI 
Regional Seat of Government- the fire service would apparently be organised 
along peacetime lines. Manpower will be 'more intensively used' and staff would 
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be expected to stay on. As Jack Warden, Lancashire'S experienced Chief Fire 
Officer, has said, 'I have a job to do and I will do it. In the event of war, there is no 
reason why that should change-there is no question of opting out'. 
Queries about emergency planning in the region's fire service should be 
addressed to: The Regional Fire Commander, County Fire Service HQ, Bolton 
Rd, Swinton, Manchester, marked: 'for the attention of Divisional Fire Officer 
Parker'. 
Many of the emergency arrangements we have looked at depend on transport: 
ambulances to ferry the injured, lorries to move food, water carriers to fetch 
drinking water, water workers needing to cut off broken mains, fire brigades to 
start firefight ing again, and so on. Yet vast numbers of vehicles would be des-
troyed , roads would often be blocked and the fuel shortage would be dire, 
especially if ports and refi neries had been hit. Accordingly, each Region, Sub-
region and county will have an inland transport co-ordinator, with various specia-
lised assistants, who will decide what can move and what can't. In theory, 
surviving private haulage finns will be important. There will be no fuel rationing: 
only vital services would get any fuel at all, and 'generally speaking, only official 
transport will be allowed on the roads'. 
The government has designated a number f roads as 'essential service routes' 
(ESRs). Those for the north-west are included in figure 9, which is neither up to 
date nor complete ; local controllers can specify their own essentiaJ routes for local 
services. In addition, the M6 (codenamed 'BUCK') and the M62 are part of the 
extra-high security Military Road Route Network, set aside for troop movements 
of all kinds. One can probably add to these the M61, which joins the M62 to the 
M6, and the M6/A74, north to Carlisle and the nuclear bases on the Clyde. ESRs 
would be little use after a nuclear attack, when only vital services have transport 
anyway and when unblocked major roads will aU be important. Tn fact, they have 
more to do with controlling the population and ensuring the movement of vital 
supplies in a general strike or insurrection, and before an attack with containing 
panic, mass gatherings and concerted opposition to the war, all of which may 
seriously interfere with preparations for its prosecution . The 'stay at home' policy 
is clearly meant as a vital part of this strategy. 
It will not work. With nuclear attack imminent, people will not stay at home, 
pottering with sandbags and waiting to die. In the words of Hampshire's emer-
gency planning officer, wno expects two-thirds of the popUlation of Portsmouth 
and Southampton to flee north 'people will probably leave work , they will march, 
they will demonstrate , there will be sabotage and chaos will reign supreme'. A 
local planner told us: 'people will run like hell and you can't blame them. If they 
start running around there will be a riot or an insurrection or something . Group 
Captain Matthews expects 'at least three quarters of a mill ion' refugees from the 
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industrial north to arrive in Cumbria (more than the population of the county) up 
the M6 (despite its protected military essential service route status), the A6, the 
A66 and the A69. There are plans to channel them into special camps, perhaps 
military camps, near the county border-one about 20 miles south of Penrith on 
the A66. Local authorities are now asked to prepare emergency accommodation 
in schools, church halls, etc., for the equivalent of 2% of their peacetime popu-
lation, to give 'transients'-people away from home or work----somewhere to go . 
The aim is doubtless to prevent such people from panicking, fleeing or rioting, for 
If you leave your car in the street, it not only 
stands a bigger chance of being wrecked but It 
may also block emergency trailic after a raid. 
the Home Office has admitted that such places 'would provide poor protection in 
the event of fallout' . Such accommodation, if generally known, would become 
hopelessly crowded (many unprepared homeowners may flee there) and more 
drastic solutions will be needed; Pontin's holiday camp in Heysham has been 
suggested as Lancaster's refugee centre. One can only imagine the public health 
and policing problems posed by herding frightened and unwilling refugees into 
these places in vast numbers, particularly after the attack, when vital services and 
government have, ceased, and no emergency services are planned for at least a 
fortnight. 
LAW, ORDER AND 
STATE SECURITY 
" The military forces and the police must be considered as one security force 
operating jointly in a previously rehearsed plan. " 
-Army Land Operations Manual Vol. III 
Counter Revolutionary Operations 
The recent surge of interest in the public protection side of home defence has 
perhaps obscured the fact that its main aim is still officially 'to secure the United 
Kingdom against any internal threat'. This was strikingly demonstrated soon after 
the system was reorganised for the 1973-4 miners' strike which saw the sudden 
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growth of local authonty home defence and emergency planning committees. 
Regional Commissioners were put on standby in December 1973 but by February 
the government had fallen and they were not activated . The following year Sir 
Leslie Mavor, then principal of the new Home Defence College (but now the 
national co-ordinator for voluntary effort in civil defence) declared: 'the full 
possibility of the present internal threat is only just sinking in'. In 1973, 'without 
reference to parliament' the power to order the military onto the streets quietly 
passed from local magistrates to the police, and ultimately the home secretary, 
while other measures in the 1970's have made the transition from 'military aid to 
the civil power' to full military/regional government much simpler. The Cabinet's 
Civil Contingencies Committee, formed in 1974 as the National Security Commit-
tee, still sits. The 1977-8 fireman's strike and the 1978-9 haulage drivers' strike 
both saw the setting up of local emergency committees similar to the top stages of 
county emergency government, consisting of the county Chief Executive, the 
chairman of the County Council, the Chief Constable, the Chief Fire Officer and 
the local army commander. One of the Home Defence College's main concerns 
are the dissident extremist political groups whom they imagine will be active in 
'promoting strikes and anti-war demonstrations, blacking certain activities and 
interfering with. the movement of reinforcements to Germany'. 32 . 
Britain is becoming no stranger to emergency forms of government; nor It 
seems, to the idea of military interventions in politics. 
TheAnny 
I n recent years the role of the army has changed. It is now (perhaps surprisingly to 
many people), primarily concerned with counter-insurrectionary measures at 
home, as laid down in Volume III ofthe Army Land Operations Manual, entitled 
'Counter-Revolutionary Operations'. These include: outbidding the rebels in 
promising reforms; setting up integrated national intelligence organisation (i.e. 
the army, police and MI5 pooling their knowledge of subversives); setting up an 
effective organisation for joint civil and military control at all levels' (the regional 
system of government) ; strengthening the police and army 'so that their loyalty is 
beyond question'; and measures to isolate insurgents from popular control' 
(arrest, internment , censorship and closing down the public phone system). The 
official scenario for 'Operation Square Leg' in 1980 included military measures to 
counter some imaginary 'Red Peace Trotskyists' and a 'Purple Peace' (i.e. 
Labour) party, and to defeat 'industrial arrest (sic) and large .scale political 
activity'. In the similar 1978 Operation Scrum Half, the army was issued with large 
quantities of riot gas. The Home Defence College's list of 'Home Defence duties 
for the armed forces' includes other activities along these line~guarding service 
bases, key points and ports, law and order, with further tasks such as 'control of 
public movement' and restoring vital services after the attack?3 The control 
measures needed to put down insurrections and to prosecute an unpopular war are 
so similar that the distinction has virtually disappeared. 
With the army's concentration on counter-revolution at home has come an 
extension of its role. From straightforward fighting to ' low intensity operations'-
intelligence and other subtle activities against 'subversive' political groups in 
pea~etime. This approach has been persued through a number of high level 
semmars, such as the 'North West District Senior Officers' Study Period' on 
Counter-revolutionary Warfare, held at Lancaster University in April 1974. The 
list of participants read like a North West army Who's Who. It included officers 
from army HQ's all over the region; officers from RAF Carlisle, RAF Sealand and 
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the Royal Navy; nine police officers including the Chief or Assistant Chief 
Constables of Cumbria, Lancashire , Manchester, Merseyside and Cheshire ; 
twelve academics from Lancaster University (including two pro-vice chancellors 
and six from the politics department); five specialist academics from other univer-
sities , as well as the right wing journalist and US 'spook', Robert Moss. Unoffici-
ally , the editor of the Daily Te,legraph, Bill Deedes (of 'Dear Bill' fame) also 
attended. The discussions ranged oyer such diverse subjects as the use of the SAS, 
the rebel Clay Cross councillors, strikers (or 'industrial guerillas') subversives and 
the possibilities for a paramilitary ' third force' to control insurrections. 34 
It is no coincidence that the territorials are already getting their call up papers 
for the 1982 Hardrock Exercise (organised by UKCICC to test out communi-
cations, civil/military co-ordination and the internal security units of the army.) 
Tony Bunyan estimates that the potential crisis strength of the army in Britain , 
including the territorials and all possible reserves is 340,000 with another 170,000 
in the Navy , RAF and their reserves. In the event of an international war, 
however, foreign commitments will drastically reduce this, hence the Defence 
Minister's creation in March 1982 of a new 4,500 strong force to guard 1,000 key 
points in the country, such as telephone exchanges, gas holders, transformers and 
pipelines. Much was made of the familiar 'Home Guard' name and the 'threat' of 
SAS style Russian sabotage squads. In fact the new fore will consist of police and 
military veterans who will serve to strengthen the state's control over essential 
services in times of crisis. 
North-west District Armed Forces HQ, incorporating Regional Seat of 
Government 10, Fulwood Barracks, Preston. 
Despite the lack of major operational bases, the army are qUIte thick on the 
ground in the North West. There are barracks and/or train jng camps (and thus 
potential internment centres) at Warcop , Halton, Weeton , Holcombe Moor, 
Bury, Chester, Liverpool, Altcar and Warrington. There are also HQ's of various 
kinds at Carlisle, Ardwick , Clifton, Chester, West Derby (Liverpool garrison) , 
Belfast docks (for 'movement and control' at the important troop landing facility) 
and of course , the North West Region Army HQ and Regional seat of government 
at Fulwood Barracks, Preston. A TA VR unit is based there and may help to 
defend it since there have been su~§estions that the T A VR would help to defend 
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the North East AFHQ at Ouston. Strategically important stores exist at Long-
town , near Carlisle , and Burscough, the ordnance depot which , like Fulwood, is 
near a big food depot. There are also Home Office Supply and Transport depots, 
which stock fire engines, water tankers, blankets, tarpaulins and probably riot 
control equipment, at Wee ton and at Great Sankey/Burtonwood. The Home 
Office regional wireless depot is at Billinge. 36 
Sub-regional Control 102, Hack Green, 
near Nantwich, with work in progress, 
May 1982. 
The Police 
Sub-regional Control 101, Duke's House, 
Houghton St, Southport. 
The police , like the army , have expanded their counter-subversion activities in 
recent years. In the same way , this ties in with their war/civil defence duties , which 
are laid down in Home Office ES circulars and the Police Manual of Home 
Defence , which are not available to civilian emergency planners. 
Chief Constables are at the top of the tree of emergency government, alongside 
the various controllers and military commanders. They will command and control 
forces with frighteningly wide emergency powers. The Superintendent of Lanca-
shire who has attended a home defence course run by UKCICC at the Army 
Defe nce School, is the 'Staff Officer to the Regional Police Commander (Desig-
nate)' , so perhaps the Regional Police Commander (designate) is the Chief 
Constable of Lancashire , Albert Laugherne. The Lancashire police have under-
taken joint exercises with the UK Warning and Monitoring Organisation . Most of 
the UKWMO 250 carrier control points, which activate sirens, are in police 
stations , including the HQ's at Manchester, Bolton , Rochdale, Wigan and Hutton 
(the Lancashire force HQ). The first four of these are all connected to two 
hardened underground telephone cables in Manchester City Centre. One going 
from Pendleton Exchange and terminating near Bailey Street , Salford , and 
another from the once secret Piccadilly underground telephone exchange to 
Islington Street, passing under the Town Hall and close by the police HQ and the 
Crown Court. (The Crown Court itself contains a restricted area giving access to 
cellars , secretly fitted up by the Ministry of Defence in 1976, with among other 
things, a ventillation system that can flood the place with gas).37 
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puring. a~ attack , .the. police ~ill shelter in protected areas in police stations, 
usmg radiatIOn momtonng eqUIpment (and the dangerously high Home Office 
dose guidelines) to decide when to come out. Many police stations will in fact be 
local. fall?ut moni~oring points. While hole(i up the Police Manual suggests that: 'If 
the hghtmg permits, personnel should pass their time reading, playing cards or in 
some other quiet way which would conserve oxygen and energy' . 
The pr.e-attack d~ties of.the police centre around controlling public movement 
by guardmg EssentIal Service Routes, freezing petrol filling stations and 'Control 
of people on foo~ and public transport'. In addition, 'the police must be prepared 
to ~o-operate ~Ith the arm~, navy and airforce authorities and give them any 
asslst~nce reqUIred. The poh.ce have statutory duties for 'billeting and impress-
ment.. Aft~r an attack, the almS are the same but the jobs multiply: 'controlling 
and .dlrectmg homeless ~eople on the streets' and if possible billeting them or 
puttmg them saf~ly away 10 'rest centres'; stopping looters ; guarding hospitals and 
emergency fe~dmg centres; and generally enforcing the state monopoly on the 
means ?f Su?slstance as a means of reasserting state control. It seems likely that 
the 'pohc~ Will also perform summary executions, but officers who object to their 
dutIes wIll have no choice in the matter. Chief Constables have the power to 
'prevent police officers from leaving the service'. Bunyan estimates that the police 
could muster over 400,000 (113,000 regulars, 100,000 'emergency reservists' and 
200,000 volunteer Special Constables). If the crisis was an internal one another 
300,000 people might be attracted into a 'citizen guard' like the one used to break 
the General Strike of 1926. This makes, with the armed forces and their reserves 
well over a million people at the disposal of the state for 'Emergency' duties . ' 
The pol~ce and military ~ill work particularly closely together in 'the guarding 
of key pomts and the mamtenance of protected areas'. The reliable volunteer 
Spe.ci~l Co~stables, (alt~ou~h the~ will in g~neral p.roba?ly have only 'support 
duties) , wII! be ~~e~l 10 o~ens!ve patrolhng agamst msurgents (and) static 
defen~e o.f v.ltal utlhty mstallatlons . HIgh on the list also come 'Special measures 
to malO tam mternal security, with particular reference to the detention or restric-
ted moye~ent of sU.bversive or potentially subversive persons'. When it comes to 
these special secunty duties, the links with current policing development are 
particularly strong. 38 
The police , like the army, are increasingly interested in domestic subversion 
the official definition of which has widened alarmingly. In 1963 Lord Dennin~ 
pronounced a 's~~versive' as anyone who wanted to overthrow the system by 
unlawful means: 10 1978, the Home Secretary decided that a 'subversive' was 
anyone who sought this through 'political, industrial or violent means'- a much 
wider definition (which is very close to that of the Army Counter Revolutionary 
Operations Manual) , covering anyone whose activities, lawful or not challenges 
the .system. The Special Branch is, according to one standard history, 'the political 
pohce for the whole of Britain' . It aims at 'collecting information about "undesir-
able' ~ political persons and movements'. 'Photographers', testified one (ex) 
Special Branch officer, 'are present at all demonstrations, and photographs are 
kept and compared'. Regular revelations about the sheer scale (and often petti-
ness) of the Branch's activities leaves no doubt that the peace movement is one of 
its targets. Although MI5 'has nearly ten times as many people working on 
subversion as the Special Branch', there are still some 1,200 Special Branch men in 
the country, of whom 164 were estimated in 1978 to be in the North West?9 
Intelligence is held on the Special Branch national computer, (which has 
files on at least 1% million people) and local computers. The Police National 
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Computer in Hendon interfaces with the Special Branch computer and of course 
all the countries forces. It is officially prepared to store 'sensitive information ' 
should the poli~ical climate be~ome more sympathetic to such measures, and may 
already be actmg as a huge mdex to such political intelligence in files stored 
elsewhere. 
More significant for this region, however, is the Greater Manchester Police 
c~mputer. Buried in the fortress like new county police HQ in Chester House , 
with entry from there o~ly via a tunnel, it will when it starts work (appropriately in 
1984) , be perhaps the bIggest local computer in Europe. Its Multi-Factor Search 
Capacity.' will be able to create instan.t lists of information keyed into anyone on a 
huge vanety of cross referenced headmg on the basis of even partial details such as 
na~e , a~~ress , or cars used, or identifying marks or associates etc. 4O A key area of 
pohce-mllItary co-operation in times of crisis will be using such intelligence 
s~stems and those o~ ~I5 to produce arrest lists of "undesirable" persons oppo-
SlOg government pohcles, for the state security forces to 'neutralise' . 
The police have a number of specially trained sections which could tackle this 
sort of forceful public order duties associated with times of insurrection or war. To 
b~gin with,. in. Britain as a whole, perhaps 500 or 1,000 of our police belong to 
hlgh~y speclahsed ~rmed squads, 'SW AT' or 'Sweeney' style groups known as 
Tactical Force Umts (or TFU's). In general the government recommends that 
5-10% ~f each force should be trained as 'authorised weapons carriers'. In 
Lancashue , at least a quarter of the police have some firearms training. 
S~condly, there are the Special Patrol Groups, best known for their actions 
~gamst troubleso~e demonstrations and pickets. Manchester's 70 strong in 1977, 
IS .calle~ the !a~tlcal Ai? Group. 'Our front line troops who are raring to go at a 
mmute s notIce accordmg to Peter Collins, the Assistant Chief Constable who 
was re.spo~sible for establishing the group in 1976. They are equipped with 
Armahte nfles and two HK-33 semi-automatic sub-machine guns which can also 
fire grenades. Greater Manchester police have also acquired stocks of 7.62mm 
'Enforcer' rifles and CS gas grenades. 
In 1978, the TAG took part in a joint Home Office exercise with the army to seal 
off the Collyhurst district of Manchester for twelve hours; residents were stopped 
at road blocks and shots were heard. 41 This was similar to a more famous anti-
subversive exercise carried out at Heathrow in 1974 to accustom people to the 
sight of troops on the streets. The Sam Cummings Interarms warehouse in Hulme 
(or. Manchester's Moss Side), contains 400,000 rifles--enough to arm both sides 
of a small war-and Manchester police have contingency plans to seal off this 
potentially anti-state arsenal in times of civil unrest. 
Thirdly there are the Police Support Units, originally formed to deal with 'the 
additional duties arising from the onset of war' but since 1974 regularly used in 
public order situations. Each unit has its own transport and consists of 35 male 
police officers and a driver, and each police division in the UK (284) should in 
theory have at least one. They only form up for training or for action, when they 
work with PSU's from other forces in dealing with crisis points. They are trained in 
riot control; Manchester's Tactical Aid Group has trained PSU's from Lancashire, 
Cheshire and Merseyside.42 
Britain now leads the world in riot control technologies, whose effecitveness 
and lethality is often sadly underestimated, and has the ideal testing ground in 
Northern Ireland. As one US Congressman commented over ten years ago now, 
"We can tranquilize, impede, immobilise, harass, shock, upset, stupefy, nauseate, 
chill, temporarily blind, deafen or just plain scare the wits out of anyone the police 
have a proper need to control. ,,43 
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In November 1981, following the summer riots and the tirst use of CS gas on the 
British mainland, the Home Office authorised that water cannon, plastic bullets 
and CS gas should be available if necessary to all British police forces in all types of 
crisis. In addition to these weapons, the Army may use the blinding and incapaci-
tating agent CR which is stockpiled throughout the UK and has been authorised 
for use here in certain special situations since 1973. CR which was discovered at 
Salford College of Technology, is currently being researched at the University of 
Manchester's Medical School as part of a study for the M.O.D. on the Neuro-
physiology of pain. CR dissolves in water and could be sprayed onto crowds from 
water cannon to blind, disorient ate and paralyse people who would then become 
easy meat for the snatch squads and their internal security vans. The connections 
Whinfell Common 
microwave relay, 
showing men at work 
replacing small dishes 
(as at left, and on the 
ground) with larger ones 
(as at right), April 1982. 
,x..........,,...,,(IIlril Similar improvements 
seem to have been made 
to other microwave 
towers in the region. 
betwe~n war policing, crisi~ policing, riot policing and political policing are 
becommg e~~r clearer, partIcularly as the aggressive 'reactive' or 'fire brigade' 
style of polIcmg advocated by Manchester's Chief Constable James Anderton 
becomes ever more widely adopted. (Anderton is himself a notorious adherent to 
t~e crude 'Red Plot: theory of politics). Home Defence training provides a vital 
link bet~een th~ police and the army, practice and politics, war and peace. Thus in 
Lancashire ~u.nng 1980 alone, (and quite apart from the highly specialised 
weapons. trammg) we fin~ the Superintendent training at the Army Defence 
Sc?ool; mspectors attendmg regional home defence courses; various officers 
go~ng on courses ~t the Home Defence College (whose emphasis on fighting 
stnkes and unrest IS well attested and geared to be passed on by those trained to 
numerous sergeants and constables); a few practicing aerial reconnaisance at RAF 
Woodvale; some 'specialist officers' doing courses in surveillance, three Task 
Forces based ~t Blac.kpool, Penwortham and Blackburn stated to be ready for any 
unusual contmgencles; the War Duties Branch 'maintaining liaison with the 
military' and taking part in 'Operation Square Leg', and the whole force taking 
part in exercises with UKWMO. 44 
.In Manchester, t~e last Emergency Planning Officer was a man who epitomized 
thiS trend. As AS~I~tant Chief C?~stable to James Anderton, he was a strong 
advocat~ of p~ramlhtary style pohcmg and was actually responsible for setting up 
the Tactical Aid Group. None other than Peter Collins. 
ALTERNATIVE 
DEFENCE 
47 
The current British nuclear defence strategy ensures that the NW will be targetted 
with nuclear weapons if war ever breaks out in Europe. Under present plans, the 
North-West would become Region 10, a sort of mini but fully militarised police 
state. In the pre-attack period of uncertainty, the people in this area will be cut off 
from their friends and relatives as the telephone system is selectively closed down. 
Outside movement will br restricted but many people will choose to ignore the 
warnings in Protect & Survive to stay put. They will attempt to flee the cities, only 
to discover that the main trunk roads are closed off to become essential service 
routes to the state security services. The crowds will be turned back to the prime 
target zones like rats in a trap. Ugly disturbances are certain to develop in some 
areas as the full implications sink in. But as the last section made clear, the police 
are already making plans for such an eventuality to move in with sophisticated riot 
technologies to reassure the public. 
After any nuclear attack, the medical system in this area would simply not be 
able to cope with the enormous numbers of casualties. Millions of people will have 
been killed in the absence of hardened shelters, many more would die as radio-
active fallout was absorbed by the remnants. Even one or two nuclear blasts in this 
area would deprive the region of electrical power due to EMP. Only the elite-the 
rich and of course the state security forces will have sufficient reserves of food and 
water. The rest will be migrating and most if not all will be either physically or 
psychically damaged ifnot both. The rural areas of the NWare expected to receive 
huge inflows of people from the connurbations of Manchester & Merseyside. But 
the plans laid are not to protect this highly vulnerable and desperate group of 
survivors. Instead they will be forcefully channelled into military camps to become 
slave labour whilst a ruthless triage system is continuously operated to ensure that 
the weakest people are deprived of medical care. The horrific consequences of 
a llowing this so called defence policy to become a reality defy our imagination. 
Research undertaken at the Richardson Institute indicates that many of these 
in ternal control measures would actually provoke and escalate the social resis-
tance they were ostensibly designed to contain. But is there an alternative defence 
to nuclear suicide given the range of real and potential threats which may be 
encountered? As it stands there are two sides to civil defence--one sensible, one 
sinister. 
The sinister side is the way in which the local availability of the basic means of 
life will be controlled from above as the only last ditch way, along with brute force, 
of keeping the system alive. This concentration on ruthless (or 'realistic') strate-
gies such as refusing aid to stricken areas in order to build up obedient pockets of 
surviving labour elsewhere involves a complex, almost baroque organisation 
which stands little chance of survival. In every instance, it owes more to the 
demands of state control in a turbulent peacetime than to those of public survival 
in war. As Peter Laurie puts it: 
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"In effect civil defence forces a government to winnow out what is vital for survival 
in society, stockpiles, depots, communications centres, research establishments etc., 
and to put it out of reach of the rest of the people. " 
If you are caught outdoors in a sud-
den attack, a hat will give you at least 
some protection from the heat Bash. 
--=-' 
Beneath the City Streets 
POtHT OF 
X 
EXPLOSION 
In case of a sudden attack in the 
country, even a furrow in a pfowed 
field will give some protection. 
I t deprives people of support just when they need it most. Yet the sensible side of 
civil defence recognises the futility of rigid planning and concentrates instead on 
supplying local points of reference around which any peacable remnants of 
communities can gather to try and recover with their own resources, which is all 
they will have. There are no guarantees here, just a good deal of flexibility. By and 
large, this sort of approach is generally dictated through lack of resources to plan 
anything further. Could an alternative defence policy develop this sensible side so 
that real protection was possible? Are there in essence alternatives to nuclear 
suicide? 
The direct answer is that most ofthe world's 140 or so nations currently favour a 
non-nuclear defence policy-95% in fact. If we unilaterally disarmed our t'lUclear 
systems, the probability of us becoming a nuclear target immediately decreases. 
But we would as a nation continue to rely on some variety of defence prepar-
ations. Its actual form is likely to become a politically contentious matter ifthe U K 
transforms into the first ex-nuclear power. . 
Whatever our defence policy, as an island we are always vulnerable to the cla~slc 
blockading tactic. Any alternative defence policy should involve both protecting 
people--even if only from being hit by missiles straying from wars elsewhere-a~d 
resisting attack. The possibility of blockades means that food and other essentJaI 
items should be stockpiled in every community whilst the country. must beco~e 
less dependent on food imports. If energy systems are too centrahsed to sustain 
nuclear attack or are vulnerable to EMP, then decentralised back up systems 
should be dev~loped which are accessible to members of the public. These co~ld 
be based upon renewable solar or wind resources which require minimum main-
tenance yet could provide a local emergency supply independent of precious fuel. 
Medical resources could also be decentralised perhaps by training teams of para-
medics in first aid, midwifery and emergency health care. Without nuclear 
weapons, a shelter building programme for the whole population instead of just 
the elite would not be seen by an enemy as provocative war preparations. There is 
no reason why such buildings should not be well known and double up to form 
community centres or be used for other socially useful services in peace time. 
Defending ourselves in this way is more challenging since most people in the UK 
simply see defence as another government service to be passively consumed, (or 
more likely be consumed by!). Building a security system as if people mattered 
means that this must change. People must take on personal responsibility for what 
happens next. 
There are four established non-nuclear defence options; conventional defence; 
territorial defence; a combination of these two; and non-violent social resistance . 
A key idea which runs through these alternative strategies is the strong influence 
which the choice of a particular means of defence can exert on the viability of 
different means of attack. There is no doubt who had the superior firepower in 
I ndia, Vietnam and Iran but firepower alone was insufficient to secure victory. 
Firstly, conventional defence. You don't need nuclear born bs to be secure. As a 
neutral country, Sweden operates a highly successful conventional defence 
system. They last went to war with neighbouring Russia in 1808, and weren't 
blown to kingdom come when the Swedish navy captured a Soviet submarine 
found in territorial waters during 1981. After the Falklands debacle, it is quite 
likely that the British Government will attempt to spend far more on conventional 
arms. However, with Trident and Cruise missile acquisition, our nuclear systems 
will also be expanded, so we will be no safer, despite the incredible costs. This is 
especially true at the regional level. 
An effective approach to regional protection is afforded by the 'territorial 
defence' system adopted by the peoples of Yugoslavia and Switzerland. This 
involves arming the popUlation to fight a peoples war. The British government 
may favour the home guard equivalent rather than fully equipping the public to 
fight a guerilla war. Armed citizens in the current economic context might decide 
they could just as easily resist the state. Indeed this is one of the benefits of the 
territorial approach. It can be successfully applied to struggle against internal 
tyranny as well as external aggression. Mixing conventional and territorial 
approaches is sometimes used as part of a phased resistance plan designed to make 
the cost of occupation unbearably expensive. 
The fourth alternative relies on the use of methods of non-violent social resis-
tance such as strikes, non-co-operation and sabotage to make continued occu-
pation both difficult and demoralising. The Polish people favoured this approach 
rather than overt confrontations and were able to sustain their resistance far 
longer than if military means had been used. The same went for the admittedly 
more militarised French resistance. Most groups who have used non-violent social 
resistance did so spontaneously without prior training. How much more effective 
they could be if this approach was more adequately developed with proper 
training, organisation and practice. 
With its hills and moorland, territorial means of defence could be effectively 
operated in the rural parts of the North West. Here the food, energy and other 
resources could be established to provide the necessary support network to sustain 
active resistance against a range of threats for a considerable period of time. A 
decentralised communications system could be built to facilitate both co-oper-
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ation and solidarity during active periods of resistance. What is more, the methods 
of Non Violent Direct Action currently applied by the peace movement could be 
adapted for use within these contexts. The whole point of these alternatives would 
be to involve the whole community to provide genuine local support, solidarity 
and protection for everyone if that culture was faced with the prospect of war. 
The beauty of some of the alternative security strategies is their ability to create 
a better society in peacetime rather than just a more militarised one. Some of the 
protection systems would provide employment opportunities--particularly in the 
depressed rural areas where a full regeneration could result. Many of the effects 
would be socially beneficial especially the enhanced medical care, renewal pollu-
tion free energy, cheaper food and so forth. 
Of course this approach would be utopian thinking of the worst sort without 
realistic planning, education and research. We need to start thinking in a new way. 
Our next government may be committed to getting rid of nuclear weapons and a 
complete re-orientation of our defence policies would be required. Some careful 
thinking needs to be done now if we are ever to have a system which really 
guarantees our security as if people mattered. 
The Dutch are probably at the forefront of this turning point and may become 
the first country to seriously research and think through the potential of engaging 
the whole population in social resistance training.45 We are clearly at the very 
beginning of what could become a tremendously significant transition. Research 
into these alternatives is vital as is widespread education about the benefits in real 
security they can offer us. The North West is fortunate in having not only a highly 
active branch 'of the peace movement but also centres of peace education and 
research. Developing an appropriate alternative approach to the defence of this 
land is destined to become one of our biggest challenges in taking the next vital 
steps towards survival. 
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APPX. A A PARTIAL LIST OF FOOD BUFFER DEPOTS IN THE NORTH WEST 
Number Addre ss So urce 
Lancashire 
a ) 314QR Railway Station, Presto n Rd, Grimsargh LUWKA (L) (1) 
b) 314E Brownedge La ne, Tardy Gate , Presto n Lancs (L) (2) 
c) Gregso n Lan~, Hogh ton Lancs 
d) Londo n Road, Adling t o n Chesh ( 3 ) 
e ) 395D Sta n l e y Street, Bl a ckburn NW (L) 
f ) 39 5K Tay l o r Str ee t, Clitheroe NW (L) 
g) 39 5L Fe n iscowl es, Bl a c kburn NW (L) 
h) 544CD Marsto n She d s , Ho rnby Rd, Claughton LUWKA (4) 
j ) 475Q Orr el l Lane , Bursco ugh Lancs (L) (5) 
Cheshire 
k) 562C 
m) 562E 
n) 344E 
p ) 344F 
q) 344G 
r) 344CD 
s) 344B 
t) 
'Run b y ' 
School Bridge, Dunha m To wn 
Ra g l an Rd , Sale 
Dunham Hil l , Thornto n Le Moor 
Mickle Trafford 
Wave r t on 
Ta r po r ley 
Tatte nhall 
Knuts f o rd Rd, Chel f o rd 
Ches h 
NW 
Che sh 
Chesh 
Chesh 
Chesh 
Chesh 
Che sh 
(L ) 
(L ) 
(6) 
(7) 
Lanc s = Lancashire Storary~ Comp any Ltd; may be same a s LUWKA 
Chesh = Che s h ire Sto rage C)mpany Ltd 
NW North Weste rn Sto r a g e Company Ltd 
LUWKA = L.U. W.K.A. Stor a g e Ltd (some times g i ven as 'Luwka' ) 
Non e o f the s e companies a ppea r in busin e ss directories consulted, s o are 
presu mably non-publi c trading sta te s ubsidiaries . The HQ of La nca s hire 
St o rage is at Bur s c ough , wh e r e t here is a n ordnanc e depot. 
Sources (L) Laurie , Bene ath the City Stree ts, 19 70 editio n (s o may be 
ou t of da te ) . 
(1 ) Presto n a rea postcode directo r y 1975 . On E side o f ma in 
rd, jus t S o f Grimsargh . Lo ngridge 3644; e me r gency calls 
af ter 5pm t o Poynton 5561 - can anyone in Poynton e xp lain? 
(2) N. Lanc s Ye llow Pages, 1980, p311 ; Pr e ston 35356 
( 3 ) Man c hester Mo le Expr ess no . 52 , 19 76 
(4 ) N. Lancs Ye l l ow Pages, 1980 , p255 . On N side o f main rd, 
be tw een Preston Fa r mers a nd Fenwick Arms. La n caste r 77027 9 
(5) Company HQ . Burs cough 893909/8921 66 
(6) Mer seys i d e & N. Wa l es phone book , 1976 
(7) Manches t e r Sou t h Yellow , 1976 
Storage sheds and 
massive telephone exchange 
at Grimsargh food depot. 
At least two mobile 
telephone exchanges are 
kept at the site, painted in 
telltale dark olive gr~en. 
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APPENDIX B ROYAL OBSERVER CORPS POSTS IN THE NORTH-WEST 
(County names used are those from before the 1972 re-organisation.) 
No. 22 Group HQ: No. 14 MU RAF Carlisle. 
No. 21 Group IlQ, and UKWMO Western Sector HQ: Langley (or 'Longley') 
Lane, Goosnargh, near Preston. 
Name 
CUMBERLAND 
Allonby 
Alston 
Bassenthwaite 
Brampton 
Caldbeck 
Carlisle 
Culgaith 
Dalston 
Eskdale 
Penrith 
Roadhead 
Threlkeld 
Whitehaven 
Wigton 
\vorkington 
CHESHIRE 
Aldford 
Altrincham 
Audlem 
Helsby 
Knutsford 
Malpas 
Middlewich 
Neston 
Poynton 
Saughall 
Tarporley 
APPENDIX C 
Region 101 
Billinge 
Winter Hill 
Hameldon Hill 
Dunhazles 
Idle Hill 
New Hey 
Barnacre 
Grid Ref 
Y.084430 
Y.724462 
Y.229328 
Y.532604 
Y.337391 
Y.383593 
Y.615294 
Y.380484 
D.135001 
Y.504293 
Y. 519748 
Y.307244 
Y.986189 
Y.252493 
Y.009295 
J.417586 
J.715889 
J.661448 
J .4937 54 
J.748794 
J.495480 
J.708663 
J.316796 
J.932827 
J.368693 
J.538638 
HOME OFFICE RELAY 
STATIONS IN 
REGION 10 
-----
Region 102 
Old Palace 
The Catch 
Sutton Common 
Frodsham 
Name 
WESTMORLAND 
Appleby 
Bampton 
Grasmere 
Kendal 
Kirkby Lonsdale 
Kirkby Stephen 
Tebay 
LANCASHIRE 
Atherton 
Bacup 
Barrow-in-Furness 
Brinscall 
Broughton-in-Furness 
Burscough 
Catforth 
Fleetwood 
Flookburgh 
Forton 
Hawkshead 
Heysham 
Longridge 
Lytham 
Padiham 
Prestwich 
St Helens 
Turton 
_MCI 
SHt. ·5<_MCl ...... . . • 
~ •• L_.''''' ...... _.0 
..... ..,....r' ........ - - - -
Grid Ref 
Y.674199 
Y.521175 
Y.322108 
D.526917 
D.603787 
Y.779088 
Y.619045 
D.692044 
D.865228 
D.172690 
D.593230 
D.218889 
D.427105 
D.455368 
D.3-25482 
D.368742 
D.496504 
D.351978 
D.409601 
D. 617382 
D.335274 
D.797349 
D.831048 
J.487945 
D.724143 
D.30409 
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FURTHER READING 
Civil defence and nuclear war 
Home Office 'ES' circulars. The official planning documents, these are mostly 
declassified and available free from: F6 Division , Home Office, Queen Anne's 
Gate. London SWl. 
One book stands out above all the others: Crucible of Despair by Anthony Tucker 
and John Gleisner. Authoritative and devastat ing analysis of UK civi l defence, 
utterly invaluable. £1.S0 inc . post from Menard Press, 8 The Oaks, Woodside 
Ave., London NI2. 
New Statesman , Britainand the Bomb (1981) , £2.2S from 10 Great Turnstile, 
London WCI. Vital research into bombs & bases . 
Paul Rogers et. aI., Lambs to the SI.1ughter (Arrow Books, ]981), £] .7S. 
Excellent introduction. 
Effects of Nuclear War. The standard work by the US Congress Office of 
Technology Assessment (Croom Helm, 1980). Expensive; order it from your 
library. 
Civil Defence-The Cruellest Con Trick. 80p from CND , ] 1 Goodwin St. London 
Nigel Calder. Nuclear Ni$!htmares (Penguin. 198]) , £] .SO. Possible wars. 
Jonathon ScheIl, The Fate of the Earth (Picador, ]982), £1.9S. 
Local studies 
Region 1 (the north-east). 7Sp + post from Days of Hope Bookshop, lIS 
Westgate Rd, Newcastle NEI4AG . 
Living on the Front Line (t-=-ast Scotland). 7Sp + post from Aberdeen people's 
Press. 163 King St. Aberdeen . 
H Bomb on Ogwr (South Wales). SOp + post from 28 Kensington Dve, Bridgend. 
The state 
Duncan Campbell, Big Brother is Listening (New Statesman, ]98]), £1.S0. 
Tony Bunyan, The Political Police in Britain (Quartet Books, ] 977). n. 9S . 
Peter Laurie, Beneath the Ciry Streets (Panther edition, ]979), £] .7S. 
Crispen Aubrey, Who's Watching You? (Penguin, 198]), £1.9S . 
C. Ackroydet. al. . The Technology of Political Control (Penguin, 1977, rev . edn. 
Pluto, 1980). 
State Research , an alert bi-monthly magazine. Sample issue 7Sp + post from 9 
Poland St. London Wl . 
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